1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

excitement among possible deputies, and convulsed the diwans of the three provincial capitals. The visits of C.U.P. committee men from Istanbul to the 'Iraq cities were received with an initial enthusiasm which was soon stifled by the inept bad manners of the visitors and the frowns of the reactionary element already mobilizing its forces. Deputies duly elected[1] left Istanbul, and a public holiday marked the assembly of Parliament in December 1908, followed four months later by another for the accession of Muhammad V.

With the departure of leading 'Iraqis to Istanbul to try their hand at politics and to influence 'Iraq affairs, if they could, through the higher appointments, a new element entered 'Iraq life. At Istanbul the 'Iraqi deputies with the Syrian formed, from the first, a compact group in the Chamber as well as participating in a literary club—al-Muntadā al-Adabi—more political than cultural; and, returning to 'Iraq for recess, they spread ideas long strange to the territory. Some leading families, indeed, scornfully opposed these vulgar dangerous innovations and regretted their paternal Sultan; tribal shaykhs, disappointed of their naïve first hopes that 'freedom' would mean non-government, clamoured for separate seats in Parliament. The minorities first hoped for equality and progress, then learned that conscription and full Ottomanization were all their gains. All alike could threaten senior officials with 'political' reprisals, take a hand at electioneering, form political clubs, and flirt with the Liberal Party which after 1911 challenged the C.U.P. But on the whole the latter, in the 'Iraq of 1908 to 1914, dominated political circles, survived periods of secession and reaction, and alone maintained a country-wide organization. And when, as in Baṣra, it was strongly opposed, such opposition arose less from the Liberals than from the greater seduction of other ideas which were now coming into full expression in 'Iraq: those of Arab nationalism.

The emergence of such a nationalist movement was as inevitable as that of reform in Turkey itself. The sense of anachronism and frustration was common to the protagonists of both; and the Arab character, proud and individualistic, is incapable of admitting permanent inferiority. The emancipation of the subject races in Europe was increasingly known to them. The Young Turk attitude to religion and the Caliph destroyed almost the only bond between Arabs and the Ottoman Government. The attainment of high office by 'Iraqis in southern 'Iraq, rumours of political life in

[1] The first Members for Baghdad in the Turkish Chamber were: Muḥammad Bey (an Istanbuli): Tawfiq Bey al-Khalidi (p. 140): Murad Bey: Fu'ad Bey al-Daftari, and Jamil al-Zahawi the poet (both members of leading Baghdad families): and the Jew Sasun Ḥasqayl (p. 127).

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

foreign suspicion. A number of 'Iraqi officers and young 'notables', who were later to attain high positions under the 'Iraq Government, were active in these politics before 1914.

Of the three wilaya capitals Mosul showed at first the least enthusiasm for the Arab Movement, dominated as it was by families of the old régime, reactionary 'Ulamā, and a deep hinterland of Kurds. Baghdad political society was split into half a dozen factions—the pro-Turk (C.U.P., Liberal, or Ḥamidiyan), the Decentralizing, those in close touch with Syria, those with Egypt, those with Baṣra, and from somewhere among all these a secret Arab Patriotic Party was formed in 1912 with a vague programme of autonomy. In the Holy Cities the Mujtahid leadership, professedly eschewing all worldly politics, was little interested in an Arab nationalism which could offer it nothing, though driven at times to favour it by detestation of all things Turkish. The priesthood adopted in general a line of anti-Christian xenophobia, with a measure of positive pan-Islamism, while the Shi'i tribes hoped only for the joys of non-government.

Baṣra, farthest from Turkish interests and nearest to independent Arabia, took an unquestioned lead in the Arab Movement. It was inspired or terrorized by Sayid Ṭalib, a younger son of the venerated local Naqib family. An able, charming, unscrupulous and ambitious statesman, gang-leader, and patriot, he had been Mutaṣarrif of al-Aḥsā, had close contacts in Najd, Kuwayt, and Muḥammara and dominated Baṣra. He was at the opening of the century already well known in Istanbul as a man of the highest promise or danger, prepared to adopt whatever allegiances would favour his rise to an independent Amirate of southern 'Iraq. He reversed, after a year, his first adherence to the C.U.P., became its bitterest enemy, and sought to be at once the leading agent of Istanbul in his wilaya, and the first of Arab patriots. In 1912 he made overtures to the British in Egypt and in Simla, in 1913 was active in collecting war funds for the Turkish armies and declaring his support of the Empire. A month later he formed a Committee of National Defence, and communicated to the Wali and the Sadr-i-A'dham—Grand Wazir—a memorial pressing for the immediate summoning of a General Council of the wilaya 'to elaborate a scheme of reforms'.

In March 1913 spokesmen in Baghdad were organizing a 'united demand' for decentralization on the model just published amid applause by a strong Beirut Committee, and were watching anti-Turk placards exposed by night in the Baghdad streets. Sayid Ṭalib meanwhile convened at Muḥammara a meeting of himself, Shaykh Khaz'al of Muḥammara, Shaykh Mubarak of Kuwayt, and high officials of Baṣra wilaya, to formulate self-government proposals.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

a Baṣra ex-deputy of moderate views and high character: and a Shi'i business man and politician and strong nationalist, Ḥajj Ja'far abu al-Timman. This Cabinet, with the loss of Abu al-Timman, accepted the Treaty late in June 1922, but it added the proviso, resisted in vain by Cox, that it must be ratified, with the Organic Law and the Electoral Law, by the coming Constituent Assembly.

The Electoral Law had been published in May, and Cabinet approval to the Treaty was followed by a first beginning of electoral processes. Anti-Treaty feeling continued to be excited, to the grave danger of public order, by the irreconcilable 'Ulamā, by the factions and self-interests of the Euphrates shaykhs, and by a locally partisan administration. The Muntafiq situation was especially threatening, and Yasin Pasha al-Hashimi, as a dominating nationalist figure, was sent there as Mutaṣarrif. Conditions elsewhere in the provinces—Dulaym, Ḥilla, Najf, Diyalā—were uneasy or even threatening. In other liwās great efforts were made by anti-Treaty (which had become synonymous with anti-British) politicians and divines to disturb tribal order, and violent trouble was momentarily expected.

Under a new Law of Associations, published in July 1921, Shi'i political elements in Baghdad formed two parties, the Waṭani (Nationalist) and the Nahḍha (Awakening); these were matched by the moderate Ḥizb al-Ḥurr (Free Party) of the Naqib's eldest son, Sayid Maḥmud al-Gaylani. Early in August, further 'patriot' meetings were held in Najf and in Baghdad. The new Shi'i parties and a press characterized more by violent and irresponsible rhetoric than by sober comment or a serious news service, demanded that the public reject the Treaty and refuse to participate in elections. al-Khalisi, veering at times towards pro-Turkish views, preached hell fire against all who compromised their independence. The Cabinet, realizing that the King was at least tolerating much of the extremist opposition to themselves and their more moderate councils, resigned in a body on 14 August.

The days following were critical for the 'Iraq Kingdom. The King's attitude had, indeed, lately been one of seeming identification with the elements most violently opposed to the Treaty: a Treaty which represented the policy not only of the British Government but of the 'Iraqi Cabinet itself. Relations with the almost infinitely patient High Commissioner were rapidly worsening. Two days before the awaited Coronation-day celebrations, 23 August, the two parties issued a violent manifesto, protested openly to the King against British influence, and demanded as Prime Minister a Shi'i leader, Sayid Muḥammad al-Ṣadr. At the levée itself, Sir Percy Cox was insulted deliberately by anti-British

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

VI

TO INDEPENDENCE

1. TREATY DEADLOCK

THE six years which followed the beginning of parliamentary Government in 'Iraq and the Mosul settlement appeared to observers largely to fulfil the hopes which the record of the years 1921 to 1926 had allowed them to form, and to justify optimism for the future. Efforts, successful in 1932, were made to complete the emancipation of the Kingdom from mandatory bonds; it became a free and equal member of the League of Nations. Foreign control was progressively reduced, then formally extinguished. Non-'Iraqi staffs diminished in numbers and function, and the 'peculiar situation' of diarchic rule, as it was accused of being, came to an end. Judicial privileges for foreigners ceased, with Courts and procedures equal for all. 'Iraq's international repute, already raised by the publicity given to, and the outcome of, the Mosul controversy, was enhanced by the debates at Geneva which concerned the country, and by its admission to the League. With its important neighbours, Turkey and Persia, it achieved normal relations: with the Arab world it greatly increased its contacts. Its communications by land and air to foreign lands developed beyond all precedent. The problems presented by the minority communities within 'Iraq remained, it was true, essentially unsolved; but they changed in character and could offer, to an optimism which the future did not justify, grounds for the hope of peaceful solution. The same is true of the powerful Shi'i block of Euphrates tribesmen. It was clear during these years that tribal resentment at the obligations of orderly Government was not extinct, and that instigation to tribal insurgence—most dangerous of weapons—could become a political manœuvre; but these were less features of this period than of the succeeding years. Meanwhile, the means of dealing with tribal unrest were further developed in the form of roads, bridges, organized forces, and a closer administrative network. The Army grew and improved, though the puzzling question of compulsory service in it was unsolved. Serious attempts were made to deal with taxation questions, a national currency was planned, the Public Debt substantially liquidated. Land Settlement procedures on modern lines were by 1932 on the point of establishment, while a great expansion of pump irrigation transformed the riverain countryside. These progressive features did not prevent the heavy affliction of 'Iraqi

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

economy by the world crisis of 1929–31, nor halt the steady diminution of the important Persian transit trade; still less did they correct those unfavourable, indeed menacing, features of 'Iraq public life which were already apparent, and were henceforth to be prevalent: short-lived Cabinets of warring personalities, futile and ephemeral parties, manipulated elections, and unrepresentative Parliaments obedient to (because chosen by) the Government of the moment.

The 'Iraq Parliament in its first ordinary session had, indeed, all the appearance of a sober and reasonable body. It dealt with nearly seventy bills, and carried out its procedure with correctness. The second session, opened on 1 November 1926, was less fortunate. Political and personal faction grew more bitter. Naji al-Suwaydi's 'People's Party', founded in August 1924, was still active, though it ceased to exist in 1927; that of National Independence, the creation of a Mosul notable, 'Abdullah al-'Umari, had already died in 1925. 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey's Progressives, founded in 1925, were dominant in moderate circles until his death, and the Popular Party (Ḥizb al-Sha'b) of Yasin Pasha flourished from late in 1925 until 1928. The Nationalist Party of Ja'far Abu al-Timman, suppressed almost at birth in 1922, revived in 1926 and continued vigorous until 1933. These, to which the Party of Awakening—Ḥizb al-Nahdha—was shortly to be added in its revived form, did nothing to tranquillize the political scene.

The second Sa'dun Ministry fell on the first day of the new Parliament, when its candidate for the Presidency of the Chamber was defeated. Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, then 'Iraqi Minister in London and a Progressive, was summoned home and three weeks later, on 21 November, formed a Coalition Ministry which included Yasin Pasha at Finance, Rashid 'Ālī Gaylani at Interior, Ra'uf al-Chadirchi in Justice, General Nuri Sa'id in Defence, the Baṣra aristocrat Amin 'Ali Basha'yan at Awqaf, Muḥammad Amin Zaki in Communications and Works, and two Shi'is, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi and 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi, at Education and the new Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture created in August 1927. This second and last ministry of Ja'far Pasha covered the year 1927. It was marked by useful legislative work, but constantly endangered by the ill discipline of the parties both in their internal factions and as between their heads and the Cabinet to which, with too little loyalty, they belonged.

The year had three features of especial political interest. The first of these was a revival, not unannounced by previous indications, of the Shi'i element as a political force. With the removal of Turkish discouragements to Shi'i emergence, and of their obscurantist leadership by the 'Ulamā whose highest effectiveness had

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

ended in 1923, a demand for participation in public life as equals in patriotism, in intelligence, and in wealth—and as numerical superiors—was inevitable; nor could it long be satisfied by a small minority of Government posts and the usual single seat in the Cabinet. It could count upon a section of the intelligentsia now growing up, upon the powerful and sect-conscious Shi'i bloc of mid-Euphrates tribes, upon the rich, land-hungry, ambitious, and highly political Sayids of that area, and upon what was left—it was not negligible—of Mujtahid influence. An episode of early 1927, the publication of a book unfriendly to Shi'ism by a Sunni schoolmaster, began a sequence of events which involved ministerial intervention as well as war to the knife in the higher circles of the Ministry of Education. The political world was divided, in a day, by a Sunni–Shi'i dichotomy; meetings of indignant demand for Shi'i rights were held in Baghdad and the Holy Cities, enlivened by a wealth of inflammatory stories of Sunni oppression, and the Nahdha Party, short-lived in 1922, was revived under almost exclusively Shi'i leadership. The presentation by the Cabinet to Parliament of a National Defence Bill—in effect, a demand for conscription—redoubled Shi'i anti-Government agitation. Their representative minister, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi, promptly resigned, and the support of the Kurds in opposing the threat of conscription was enlisted. 'Abd al-Mahdi was replaced at Education by Amin Zaki, and the latter at Irrigation and Agriculture by the Shi'i 'Alwan al-Yasiri. The Prime Minister secured an adjournment of Parliament in time to save his Government; but it led only to the transfer of the main political activity from Baghdad to the Euphrates. The Minister of Finance was boycotted when on tour in Najf, and it needed all the King's tact and generosity to prevent grave consequences from a violent scuffle which occurred in Kadhimiya on the ever-dangerous 10th of Muharram between 'Iraqi troops and Shi'i worshippers. The two Shi'i ministers now in the Cabinet were both anathema to the Nahdha Party. The latter organized demonstrations in Karbalā and Najf, and inspired articles in its newspapers so savage as to lead Yasin Pasha, as acting Prime Minister, to suppress it. When his action was questioned, he resigned, and in this step was followed shortly by Rashid 'Ali al-Gaylani. The year ended with Shi'ism dangerously militant and the Government gravely weakened. On 7 January 1927 Ja'far Pasha resigned.

The conscription issue was a second dominant interest of the time. The need to strengthen 'Iraq militarily was implicit in its claim to be sole master in its own house. Was conscription the solution? The High Commissioner, consulted, replied in effect 'Certainly, if 'Iraq desires it, but not if it must involve enforcement

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

a veteran nationalist, Shaykh Aḥmad al-Da'ud, to Awqaf. The former coalition being now disrupted, the Prime Minister called for a general election. His shrewd organization of the Progressive Party, and the power of the executive to influence electors' choice, secured him a majority of 66 out of 88 seats after elections peaceably conducted. The new Chamber contained 26 Shi'is and 16 Kurds. In face of the delicacy of the conscription question, the influence of an Opposition stronger than was suggested by the fewness of its parliamentary spokesmen, and the thunders of the parties with their hotly anti-British and anti-Treaty press, no progress on controversial issues could be made. Amendments to the Agreements subsidiary to the Treaty were lengthily discussed between ministers and the High Commissioner, but no agreement was in sight. 'Iraqi demands for complete and immediate control of its own defence, for abrogation of the provision that joint Anglo-'Iraqi forces should be under British command, and for abolition of the Customs exemptions enjoyed by British forces, were all unacceptable; and without accord on these matters there could be no Treaty. Conscription was, amid bitter Opposition criticism, dropped for the moment from the Progressives' programme.

The Sunni–Shi'i position meanwhile improved, thanks to the efforts of the wiser men on both sides. The Nahḍha Party lost support, and political emotions were directed rather in common against what they felt to be the ever-present and ever-obstructive British. The year 1928 saw the worst phases of the 'peculiar situation' (*al-Wadha' al-Shadh*) beloved as a theme for vituperation by 'Iraqi journalists and humorists. The 'peculiarity' was that of independence—under a Mandate: ministerial responsibility—under advisory watchfulness: aspiration to military strength—but with conscription 'forbidden'; a port and a railway administered by 'Iraq—but the property of others: privileges for foreigners in 'Iraq—but none for 'Iraqis abroad: and in general the ambiguities, overlappings, and frustrations of an adolescent society and Government impatient to be rid of the foreign control, condescension, and wiseacre advice which its politicians never wholly trusted and frequently misunderstood.

'Abd al-Muḥsin, thwarted as he felt by the British and the Opposition alike, resigned office in January 1929. Remaining as head of a caretaker Government until superseded, he pledged his party to support no Government that did not insist on radical amendments in the two Agreements. The successor Ministry, formed in April by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, belonged equally to the Progressive Party and could attempt little. The Ministers of Interior, Finance, Works, and Irrigation—Qaṣṣab, Ghanima,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and the fullest activity of their press articles, hand-bills, and oratory, did not hesitate to invoke the authority of the Shi'i Mujtahids in condemnation of the new Treaty. These, however, declined for once to intervene, except partially at Samarrā, and the elections were peacefully conducted in the districts; only at Sulaymaniya a major clash between violent demonstrators and the police resulted in bloodshed and the loss of a score of lives. All results were known by the end of October 1930, and showed a sweeping victory of the Government party. The ratification of the Treaty by Parliament, which met as usual on 1 November, could not now be prevented by the fierce denunciations of die-hard patriots; the voting was in favour by 69 against 13 in the Chamber, 11 against 5 in the Senate.

But much remained to be done, both in Baghdad and in Geneva. Parliament sat on, immersed in legislation and in vehement politics, until the midsummer of 1931. The opposition to the Sa'idi Ministry had by that time been reorganized in a grouping more formidable than the isolated Nationalist Party which, thanks to the usual control exercised by the liwā officials, had made so poor a showing in the elections. Political leaders hostile to Nuri and, with reservations, to the Treaty—Yasin al-Hashimi, Naji al-Suwaydi, Rashid 'Ali al-Gaylani, and 'Ali Jawdat who had resigned from the Cabinet in September and been succeeded by Rustum Haydar from the Palace—formed from the Nationalist and the People's Parties and like-thinking elements a Party of National Brotherhood—Hizb al-Ikhā al-Waṭani. At its inaugural meeting in March 1931 its objects were stated to include the dissolution of a flagrantly unrepresentative Parliament and the formation of a new Government 'pledged to reconsider the external relations of 'Iraq'. Certain of its members as a gesture thought fit to resign their seats in the Chamber; all resolved to pursue their campaign in the press and country. Nuri Pasha on his side had already formed, from deputies favourable to him, the 'Ahd (Covenant) Party, with an appeal to the great days of al-'Ahd and a programme of Treaty implementation.

Among the first acts of the Ikhā was the organization in July 1931 of a series of strikes in the 'Iraq townships without precedent for their concerted timing and wide extent. They had little object but the embarrassment of Government. The trades' organizations in the bazaars took fright—or were maliciously alarmed—at a clause in the newly passed Municipal Taxation Law which could be read as unfavourable to them. The misunderstanding, which was easily elucidated by Government, was encouraged to persist, and it was not until late in July, after attempts had been made to spread unrest to northern 'Iraq, and disorder in Baṣra and the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Euphrates towns had led to bloodshed and police intervention, that the agitation died down: the product, it seemed, of a new and sinister type of 'Iraqi politics. The Brotherhood, successful in this effort, proceeded next (said its enemies) to make what capital it could from the dangerous uneasiness of Kurd–Arab and Assyrian–Kurd relationships.

The attitude of the minorities to the forthcoming emancipation of 'Iraq and withdrawal of British control could not, indeed, be other than a serious preoccupation of the 'Iraq Government as well as of Great Britain and of the League itself. In Baghdad the privileges claimed by or on behalf of the Kurdish districts, and the future of the Assyrians, were questions the more insistent as the attention of the League was concentrated on these aspects of 'Iraq life. The Government did its best at reassurance by repeated tours of the King and his Ministers in the Kurdish areas, by legislation on the use of the Kurdish language, by promises to honour all pledges given in the past, and by such practical gestures of goodwill as were available; but the whispers of the ill disposed were effective, nevertheless, in increasing the alarm of Kurd and Assyrian alike.

With minor Cabinet changes—the loss of Madfa'i to preside in the Deputies, and the addition of Dr. 'Abdullah Damluji in Foreign Affairs—and a re-formation in October 1930, the Ministry of Nuri Pasha maintained itself, in spite of Brotherhood intrigues and assaults, from its formation in March 1930 until November 1932. His second Cabinet, which took office on 19 October, brought Naji Shawkat to Interior, Rustum to Finance, Jamal Baban to Justice, Ja'far to Foreign Affairs, Amin Zaki and Chalabi to Works and Education. Little was heard for the moment of Sunni–Shi'i friction, save implicitly in minor disorders: and nothing of the threat or hope of conscription, which the Sa'idi Government wisely postponed until the obligation to listen to High Commissioners was no more. The major interest of the time was, evidently, that of securing 'Iraq's admission to the League, for which 1932 was the appointed year.

The intention of His Majesty's Government to make this recommendation had been communicated to the League Council in September 1929, and was likely thenceforward to raise questions of procedure for which no precedent existed. The Permanent Mandates Commission, to which annually since 1921 spokesmen of the mandatory Power had presented its Report with full verbal explanations, had never relaxed its interest in 'Iraqi affairs and the British trusteeship. It now scrutinized the 1929 Report for signs of 'Iraq's adequacy or inadequacy for emancipation, closely questioned the British 'accredited representative' at Geneva, and

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642 therefore, nor to any Western observer did it occur in 1920 not to install the forms of government both familiar at home and seemingly demanded in 'Iraq. Nevertheless, this most exacting of constitutional forms was now seen to be acclimatizing itself in 'Iraq with difficulty and with mixed immediate results. If it is true that the virtues of the system are everywhere appreciated, and no better alternative has been discovered by the modern world, yet, to be in fact representative and democratic, it demands certain conditions. 121 Did these exist in 'Iraq? There was, certainly, a long Arab tradi- 665 tion of tribesmen's democracy and easy access to rulers. Free 204 speech, a vigorous and copious press, busy parties, 'demonstrations' in every street and school: all these could be claimed as democratic features of Baghdad life. But with what truth? The press was ill informed, irresponsible, rabidly partisan, crudely xenophobe. The demonstrations were organized, easily and cheaply, at any politician's direction. The parties were, so far, mere cliques of personalities, without continuity or breadth of organization or any consistent policy unless that of mere Anglophobia. Freedom of speech was allowed to extreme, rarely to moderate, views; violence or boycott awaited the exponent of any policy, however wise or sincere, if it seemed to fail in nationalist fervour. It was indeed doubtful whether one educated 'Iraqi in a hundred conceived society on truly democratic lines or, given power, would have wished so to organize it. Their nature was individualistic and insubordinate, their tradition authoritarian, and the conditions in 641 their society inimical to democracy. The representatives in the 666 Chamber itself were in fact selected less by the votes of an instructed electorate, which did not exist, than by the nomination of the Cabinet in power; the list conveyed to the Mutaṣarrifs as that of Government-sponsored candidates was, with infrequent exceptions, that of the Deputies.

642 It resulted that in 1932 the Government of 'Iraq consisted of 662 a façade of democratic forms behind which, emerging from the stresses, strains, and violences of faction and egoism, operated the actual power of a small ruling class: a class which contained on the one hand more than enough figures capable of filling the ministerial posts available, but on the other too little variety of viewpoint to compete for power by the advocacy of genuinely alternative programmes. The result was an uneasy shuffle of offices, short-lived Cabinets with a brief innings for everybody, and the fortunes of Ministries dependent not on the attitude of representative Deputies capable of a gesture of dismissal, but on personal faction behind their backs. It was already clear that if ever the only authoritative hand not involved in these uneasy intrigues should be removed—that of the King—there would be opportunity, or almost inevita-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

bility, for some other power to intervene with decision; a part which, in the event, was to be that of the Army.

It may be asked, would a frankly authoritarian government—dictatorship, acknowledged oligarchy or mere Arab patriarchy—have been preferable? It would in all likelihood have been still less acceptable to its public than the pseudo-democracy actually imposed; the procedures of democracy, however ill conducted, were at least educative and might later show a narrowing gulf between form and spirit. Even a semi-nominated Chamber contained enough of intelligence, experience, and public spirit to be a valuable deliberative and critical body; politics and press at least provided an arena of action for the intelligentsia, whose suppression would be dangerous as well as improper. The only alternative to 'democracy' might well prove to be a tyranny oppressive within and, by its probable international adhesions, dangerous without. 'Iraqi political history for the ten years following its achievement of independence was to be one of the alternation in short cycles of the imposition and the relaxation of authority: the former accompanied by protests and violent intrigues against 'slavery', the latter always abused by licence turning to anarchy.

There was reference above to a ruling class. In fact, claimants to leadership were more than one, and their claims if permitted could be scarcely consistent with a democratic régime. In tribal society the position of the shaykhs, with all their intestine rivalries and schisms, was still unchallenged though no longer State-sponsored. Among the Shi'i population, and especially among the tribes of the Euphrates, the influence of the 'Ulamā was still considerable and rarely exercised in the direction favoured by Government. Officialdom, an alternative source of leadership and itself a main social element, was now broadened by full admission of the Shi'is, and its standard of education, conduct, and efficiency had risen markedly since Turkish times; but nothing in its position or allegiances could lead it to a sense of solidarity with the masses. The same is true of the non-official part of that important middle class whose upper edges touched the ministerial, the lower the proletariat class, and which included the lawyers, students, journalists, doctors, superior shop-keepers, commercial employees, higher technicians, middlemen, and ex-officers. Extending from bare literacy to some learned pretensions, the class was self-conscious as the evolved and progressive element in their country; but it was frustrated by lack of active outlets in public life and especially by failure to break into the ruling circle. From it were arising, already before 1932, the new politicians and publicists. Not without quick intelligence and shrewdness, and often effective

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

political unity today. A further obstacle must be the intolerant individualism of the Arab character, so recalcitrant to self-subordination and compromise. These difficulties were all to be faced when twelve years later Arab Unity was to become, largely under 'Iraqi inspiration, a formal political reality; and they were to prove formidable.

2. ASSYRIAN CLIMAX

The administrative and political features of 'Iraq life as these existed in 1932 had been current already for three years or more; there was consequently little sign of sudden change in the autumn of that year to indicate the removal of restraints and growth of dangerous tendencies which the last pages have described. Nuri Pasha Sa'id was not anxious to prolong his premiership; his position, strong in Parliament, had been heavily attacked outside by the Ikhā and the Nationalist Party. Their newspapers, repeatedly suppressed and as often reappearing, assailed the Treaty, the British, and the Cabinet, until a 'Law for the prohibition of harmful propaganda' was passed to restrain them. The Liberal or Reformist group now forming among the lawyers, the journalists, and the impatient 'enlightened' elements, who were turning for the first time to social questions as the background of politics, hoped to range itself and its newspaper, the *Ahali* (People), with a more progressive Government. The King and his advisers thought in terms of specific advances, adapted to the new times: advances towards greater national unity—Sunni–Shi'i, landlord–tenant, tribe–town, and Kurd–Arab—better administration, more devolution, and a stronger Army. Such a programme could best be realized by an all-party Administration, and this must indicate a Cabinet of the Ikhā with 'Ahd and independent elements. Moreover, ill-feeling based on personal and private matters, perhaps even on some tinge of royal jealousy at Nuri's successes, had rendered the Pasha's position barely tenable.

But the Ikhā–Nationalist pact was still recent, and the King could not admit the only condition on which Yasin Pasha and Rashid 'Ali, now Chief of the Royal Diwan, and their associates would accept office: that of Treaty revision. The compromise adopted, therefore, was that of a neutral Government headed by Naji Shawkat. It included eminent lawyers—the cautious and able Naṣrat al-Farsi, Jamil al-Wadi, and Jalal Baban—a distant cousin of Jamal Baban, and like him a Kurd for ministerial purposes—in the Ministries of Finance, Justice, and Works: Rashid al-Khawja, an able ex-officer who had been Mutaṣarrif of Baghdad, in Defence: a competent and moderate Shi'i, 'Abbas Mahdi, in Education: and the prudent 'Abd al-Qadir Rashid in Foreign Affairs. The

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

lucrative trusteeship of the Qadiri Awqaf. The Shi'i Minister of Education, Ridhā al-Shabibi, resigned in September 1935 and was replaced by a Shi'i of different type, the lawyer Ṣādiq al-Baṣṣam. Relations with the other Arab States were notably extended by a Treaty with Sa'udi Arabia, exchanges of princely and ministerial visits, and missions received from Syria, the Yaman, and Egypt; and 'Iraqi statesmen, particularly Nuri Sa'id, responding to strong public opinion, took in 1936 jointly with Ibn Sa'ud a leading part in intervening in the long-drawn Palestine Arab strike. Nevertheless, critics in Baghdad were not wanting who called for stronger anti-Zionist action than the telegrams, deputations, and appeals of the Hashimi Ministry; and they recalled that Yasin Pasha in opposition, in 1932 and since, had led an anti-Treaty and anti-British policy very different from his present complacence.

Other gestures of Opposition politicians, embittered by long exclusion from office, were those of horror at the brutality of the Euphrates tribal suppressions, and disapproval of the recurring use of the Army for police measures. They pointed at the private fortunes which, mysteriously, certain ministers were said to be amassing; and they execrated the alleged spy system which was one of the ministerial means of control, and the suppression of newspapers inclined to criticize them. From the left-wing Ahali group a particular dissatisfaction arose. They saw, under Yasin Pasha, no hope of carrying out the reforms which they advocated. Shedding an extremist and in certain cases Communist or near-Communist minority, the group grew with the adhesion of other unemployed politicians. Though never formed as a party, they stood for social reform and land reform on lines which, while excluding class warfare, must yet include some measure of redistribution of wealth, some improvement in the conditions of the working class, and some trespass on feudal and plutocratic privilege. Prominent in the movement were Ja'far abu al-Timman, Kamil al-Chadirchi (a young half-brother of Ra'uf), Yusif 'Izz al-Din a financial expert of Kurdish descent, and a half-dozen of English- or American-educated intellectuals. Government lack of sympathy with their efforts, and the arrest of their less discreet members, led them finally to oppose the régime with a bitterness which would accept allies from any source.

No statesman felt more impatiently his exclusion from power than Ḥikmat Sulayman. Of excellent ability and generally popular, he assessed shrewdly the strength of the various anti-Hashimi forces, and admired the authoritarian structure of Turkish politics, which country he revisited in 1935. In Baghdad he was allied with the left wing, and resentful at newspaper suppressions which affected him personally; and he placed himself increasingly in con-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

tact with leaders of the Army. The latter, its morale uplifted by triumphs over Assyrian villagers and Euphrates tribesmen, was asking whether to serve the intrigues and ambitions of the Baghdad politicians was, after all, the ideal: whether direct dominance of the State by its armed force, as in Turkey or Persia, would not be more congenial? The stages by which Ḥikmat Sulayman and the forceful sinister Bakr Ṣidqi came into closer agreement, and the latter abandoned his loyalty to Yasin Pasha and his brother Ṭaha, cannot now be traced. To Ḥikmat the immediate desideratum was a change of Government in his own favour, and only the Army could produce this; Bakr Ṣidqi's ambition was to effect a stroke which would assure the Army of a paramount position and himself the headship of the Army. Neither at any time sought, it seems, a personal or formal dictatorship.

In October 1936 Ṭaha left 'Iraq to visit Turkey, leaving Ṣidqi, then commanding the 1st Division, to act in his place. The autumn manœuvres on the middle Diyalā gave occasion to concentrate almost all of the armed forces outside the capital. The plot concerted by Bakr with Ḥikmat Sulayman was communicated to a few officers at Qaraghan, notably 'Abd al-Laṭif Nuri, the general commanding the 2nd Division. The two generals drafted a letter to the King, demanding the formation of a new Ministry under Ḥikmat, and handed it to the latter. Leaders of the left-wing group were admitted to the secret. The Air Force under its Commander, Muḥammad 'Ali Juwad, a close friend of Ṣidqi, was concentrated at Qaraghan and was provided with leaflets to scatter over Baghdad at the appropriate moment. On the night of 28 October the Army, renamed the National Defence Force for the occasion, began its 'march on Baghdad'.

By early morning of the 29th leaflets rained from the sky over Baghdad, and Ḥikmat conveyed the agreed letter to the palace. Yasin Pasha and his colleagues, amazed at a turn of events wholly unexpected, made their way to the King's ante-room, where Ghazi had already summoned the British Ambassador. The latter advised His Majesty to consult his Cabinet, to ascertain the intentions of Ḥikmat, and to proceed, above all, constitutionally. The ministers, now joined by all their colleagues except Rashid 'Ali, were ready to resign. Bombs fell on Baghdad in the mid-morning, a three-hour time limit for the Cabinet's surrender having expired, and some civilians killed and wounded showed the zeal of the Royal 'Iraqi Air Force. After a discussion which could end but one way, the Cabinet resigned, and a Royal Irada appointed Ḥikmat Sulayman to form a new Ministry.

One shocking incident distressed the public, horrified the British Ambassador, and disgusted Ḥikmat himself—the brutal murder of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

665 669 Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari by Army officers half-way between Baghdad and Ba'quba, under the direct orders, it was believed, of Bakr Ṣidqi. Ja'far as Minister of Defence had left Baghdad by car with a letter to Bakr from the King, intending to meet the Commander, inform him of the change of Government and arrange for a cessation of violence. His body, that of a sincere and devoted patriot and an honest man, was hastily buried by the roadside while the Army pursued its triumphant march to the capital. The troops entered the city ceremonially in the early evening, with Bakr Ṣidqi at their head.

*645 The Cabinet formed and announced by Ḥikmat on the same day reserved the Ministry of Interior to himself, brought three members of the Ahali group, Abu al-Timman, Kamil al-Chadirchi, and Yusif 'Izz al-Din to Finance, Works, and Education, Ṣaliḥ Jabr to Justice, Naji al-Aṣil to Foreign Affairs. Ṣidqi's fellow conspirator 'Abd al-Laṭif Nuri was rewarded with the Ministry of Defence, while Bakr himself superseded Ṭaha al-Hashimi as Chief of Staff. Great enthusiasm, real or feigned, greeted the new Government. The announced programme, and a broadcast by Abu al-Timman, were rich in optimism and promises. Giant demonstrations were arranged in Baghdad, and the capital's main streets were a stage for the dancing and singing of crowds of tribesmen and workers. The outgoing Ministry was everywhere denigrated. Its members, whom Bakr would have preferred to assassinate with other likely opponents, vanished temporarily from public life: Yasin Pasha and Rashid 'Ali to Syria under escort, Nuri Sa'id by R.A.F. aircraft to Egypt. Other ex-ministers and some high officials retired amid the many changes made in personnel by the incoming ministers.

The Prime Minister, who kept at all times correctly in contact with the British Ambassador—and lost some nationalist following by so doing—assured him and the world that this was no military dictatorship; it was merely parliamentary and democratic government supported by a devoted Army. Bakr Ṣidqi, in fact, interfered little in current administration. He had no obvious policy save a crude Anglophobia, and limited his exigencies to nomination of his friends to certain appointments and insistence on priority for the Army's needs. A vindictive proposal to inquire into the private fortunes of ex-ministers was at first accepted but finally abandoned.

*645 665 Opposition nevertheless was not slow to organize, and could muster effective elements. Moderate opinion everywhere saw with consternation the open assumption of power by a selfish and short-sighted military movement. The new Government in its proclaimed programme had said little of anti-Treaty proposals—indeed, had spoken of friendship with all countries and was pledged to maintain the Treaty. In spite of some self-justifying gestures to

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the contrary, it was criticized by anti-Zionist enthusiasts, by ardent members of the pan-Arab Muthannā Club in Baghdad, and at times in Egypt and Syrian newspapers, as being less than whole-hearted on the question of Arab unity. Bakr Ṣidqi was a Kurd, Ḥikmat Sulayman by sympathy more Turk than Arab, and the Ahali group cared little for international politics. The tone of its early programme and of the speeches of Chadirchi and Abu al-Timman were equalitarian and easily labelled Communistic, and they alarmed the established classes. The Reformist group had indeed assumed its share of power with high hopes; but for all their newspaper and their 'People's Reform League', to which four ministers belonged, they found little popular support. They were opposed by the shaykhs who feared for their own positions, and thwarted by the Army who distrusted or despised them. The efforts of the group, laudable as they were as appreciating something of the real weaknesses and evils of 'Iraq society, were politically unprofitable to a Ministry dominated by the Army and by reaction. The freedom of the press and of politics promised for all, in contrast to Yasin's régime, ceased to be permitted as soon as opponents grew active. Political and tribal prisoners including the Yazidis were released and a general amnesty proclaimed; but not long afterwards measures of suppression were taken as severe as those of a year earlier. Meanwhile friends of Ja'far Pasha—and notably his brother-in-law, Nuri Sa'id, tirelessly manœuvring and writing from Egypt and Syria—would forgive neither the murder nor its perpetrators, nor the willingness of the King and the present Cabinet to leave it unpunished. And, with all these elements of criticism and discontent, those endemic on the middle Euphrates were still alive, and soon to burst into violent activity.

Nowhere indeed were the embarrassments of Ḥikmat's position clearer than in his attempts to solve the insoluble Euphrates problem. He must placate malcontents without offending their enemies: he must pardon the already condemned, but not show weakness: must keep order, but without a harshness which would be resented. Starting with all confidence in his own good intentions and diplomatic skill, he signally failed. The ferment of self-seeking and vengeful faction which was the normal life of Euphrates shaykhly and religious circles refused to cool at his bidding. A notorious land dispute among the Bani Zurayj of Samawa qadhā was the occasion to rally once again the forces supporting and opposed to 'Abd al-Waḥid al-Ḥajj Sikr and Muḥsin abu al-Ṭabikh. These flouted the orders of the Ministry to a point which made inevitable a return to the severity with which Ḥikmat Sulayman had hoped to dispense, the two inveterate trouble-makers were deprived of their parliamentary immunity, arrested, and sentenced to detention in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

*645 668 northern 'Iraq. In June 1937 continued lawlessness at Samawa led to military operations on the habitual pattern, with destruction of villages, tribal attacks on the qadhā town, and (it was said) the shooting of hostages by the Army. Deep as was the impression made on the tribes by this treatment, peace never returned to these troubled regions during the life-time of the Sulaymani Ministry. In the towns, security was reasonably maintained, and isolated acts of anti-Jewish violence which had occurred in Baghdad in 1936 were not repeated.

646 665 The Ministry remained unhappy in the political sphere. The general elections ordered in November 1936 and completed in February 1937 produced a Chamber from which indispensable compliance with Ṣidqi's wishes had excluded the bulk of former Deputies and all but twelve of the Reformists; but had admitted, as a conciliatory favour, some ill-chosen wildlings from the Euphrates tribes. In the four months of the Extraordinary Session from February to June 1937 the Chamber was uneasy and divided, with painful friction between the Ministry's own ill-assorted followers. This, and the frustrations of their minority position, and their dislike of the re-adopted harsh policy at Samawa, led in June to the resignation of the four Reformist ministers. While still in 468 office their influence, especially that of Chadirchi, had inspired, perhaps encouraged, serious strikes among industrial workers. So were explained the successive strikes at the Kut barrage, in the drilling-areas of the B.O.D. Company, in the Railway workshops, among the Port workers and the Najf weavers, and among the 'Iraq Petroleum Company's labour at Kirkuk. These strikes, whether industrially justified or not, reflected a new spirit of labour self-consciousness not necessarily unhealthy—and a new political weapon.

*645 665 Ḥikmat's hopes of strengthening his Cabinet by the inclusion in it of leading statesmen—Nuri Sa'id himself, or Jamil al-Madfa'i—could not but fail since few now trusted Bakr or the uneasy régime itself. Of the four new ministers, two, 'Ali Maḥmud al-Shaykh and Muḥammad 'Ali Maḥmud, were Sunni lawyer-politicians and functionaries, and two, 'Abbas Mahdi and Ja'far Ḥamandi, were Shi'is of similar background. They were posted to the Ministries of Justice, Finance, Works, and Education respectively; but they were politically of little weight. The breach between the Reform movement and the Government was now complete; the People's Reform League was suppressed, and prominent Communists, real or alleged, were arrested. Two of the most active, 'Abd al-Qadir and Yusif, sons of Isma'il, fled to Paris. The Army dominated, ever more obviously, the Prime Minister and his Government.

*645 The position was one which Bakr Ṣidqi could not but abuse. He

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The new Parliament assembled on 23 December. Its members, selected with the greatest care, did not include Ḥikmat Sulayman or, save one, any of his Cabinet. Nevertheless, the session was a stormy one. Partisans of Ja'far Pasha returned hotly but always in vain to the attack; their final demand for a judicial inquiry was refused as being incompatible with the Act of Indemnity for all the 1937 offenders or suspects, which was passed by Parliament in March. The ill-feeling between Nuri Sa'id and Ḥikmat, not in itself unfavourable to the stability of the Madfa'i Ministry, was interrupted only by Nuri's long absences from the country; his visits to 'Iraq were treated as danger signals. The ejected ministers of the Hashimi Cabinet waged constant war in Parliament with the beneficiaries of the Bakr Ṣidqi régime, with mutual accusations of intrigue or treason; nothing, after all, had changed in the politics of Baghdad! Parliament adjourned on 7 May. Sir Maurice Peterson had replaced Sir A. Clark Kerr as British Ambassador two months earlier.

Politics apart, the year 1938 was one of exceptional tranquillity. All was quiet in Kurdistan, bandits were arrested or dispersed in Bazyan, the Sulaymaniya countryside was untroubled. Shaykh Maḥmud's properties, confiscated in 1931, were restored to him. A normal qadhā administration was introduced for the first time into the Pishdar area. The murder of an American missionary, Mr. Cumberland, by Doshki tribesmen in Dohuk qadhā was an isolated crime. The signs of mourning in Kirkuk at the death of Kamal Ataturk could be ignored as harmless. The arrest and trial of Communists in Baghdad was approved by all; Parliament legislated to declare Communism in 'Iraq illegal and its votaries dangerous criminals; the movement was forced underground. No strikes interrupted industrial work or the public services. The middle Euphrates remained precariously quiet. An outbreak of fighting between two 'Amara tribes was composed, after serious bloodshed, by a Muntafiq arbitrator. In the western desert, traditional Shammar-'Uqaydat hostilities dragged on.

Efforts were made to obtain arms for the 'Iraq Army on sounder lines than those of Bakr Ṣidqi. Discipline improved, Kurd-Arab bickering in the forces was reduced, and the old Royal Air Force quarters at Hinaydi—known henceforward as al-Rashid Camp—were occupied by the 'Iraq Army. The R.A.F. completed its move to Ḥabbaniya, where a cantonment with modern amenities had been erected.

The Assyrian question moved towards a solution—or a confession of insolubility. The Khabur settlements were, in part at 'Iraqi expense, made self-supporting under the League Committee's arrangements, and after 1938 the 'Iraq Treasury was relieved

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

visitors made their appearance at the Muthannā Club, which had been founded in 1935 as a pan-Arab centre and the home of the Palestine Defence League. Nevertheless, the *fatwas* of 'Iraqi divines favouring immediate Jihad in Palestine were discredited by their Government, the more violent demonstrations dispersed and later forbidden, and bomb-throwing in the Jewish quarters, reported in August 1938, was suppressed. Mawlud Mukhliṣ represented 'Iraq at the Parliamentary Conference on Palestine in Cairo in October; Nuri Sa'id handed proposals of his own, conceived with moderation and good sense, to the British Government; and Tawfiq Suwaydi was not less active in Geneva and London. In the London Conference, which met on 7 February 1939—its composition clearly foreshadowing the future Arab League—Nuri, by that time again Prime Minister, was as ever prominent through his constructive proposals and authoritative by the contacts he had maintained in the Arab capitals and with the now exiled Mufti. The British White Paper of May 1939, the initial Arab opposition to which must soon have turned (and in fact turned) to acceptance, was for the time unable to appease the powerful Arab sentiment against Zionism and its supporters. No element in all 'Iraqi-British relations of the period 1937 to 1941 was more powerful in poisoning them than the tragically mishandled Palestine Question.

In the Munich crisis of September 1938 the attitude of Madfa'i and his Cabinet was strictly correct to their ally and stern towards Dr. Grobba and his countrymen. The event indicated nevertheless to 'Iraq, in a new light, the menacing cleavages of Europe, and evoked from sections of the public and Army the admiration for German ruthlessness and successes to which the last few years had predisposed them: and, with that admiration, the beginnings of reluctance to support a pacific and reputedly pro-British Prime Minister. The orientation of 'Iraq towards or away from the Axis Powers became, from Munich onwards, one of the questions dividing the Baghdad politicians, to whom respect for the 1930 Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty, in spirit or letter, was no matter of course. This division contributed an element to the weakness of Madfa'i's position, which by the autumn was apparent. Major changes in the Cabinet were necessitated in October by a series of personal attacks on Muṣṭafā al-'Umari; he was transferred to Justice and 'Abbas Mahdi to Works, the Prime Minister himself taking the portfolio of Interior. To Defence was appointed Ṣubiḥ Najib, an ex-officer who had served for some years as Director-General of Police, and more recently as Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; he was however junior in rank to many of the serving generals, who resented his promotion as minister.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The opening of Parliament on 1 November heralded a period of political strife in which some opposition speakers were hot in protest against the Baṣra concession, others—Rashid 'Ali and Ḥikmat Sulayman prominent among them—revived the bitter controversies of the last three years, and others found pretexts to revile the Government for its suspension of suspect officials, and for the suppression of demonstrations and seditious newspapers to which it had been unwillingly driven. When, late in November, an outbreak of bomb-throwing in Baghdad was attributed (probably with justice) to anti-Government agitators, the Cabinet had recourse to the Seditious Propaganda Law passed earlier but not hitherto invoked, and under its terms banished to remote townships a number of their more violent opponents. These included officers known for their loyalty to Bakr Ṣidqi, prominent lawyers, and politicians of ministerial pretension; and the impending crisis drew nearer when the outspoken provocations of Rashid 'Ali led to his arrest and dispatch to 'Ana. The friends of these exiles lost no time in approaching other like-thinking malcontents on the one side, and Army chiefs on the other. Among the latter, the group later to be known as the Golden Square was already formed, resolute and ruthless. It consisted of Ṣalaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh, commanding the 3rd Division stationed in and around the capital, Kamil Shabib, commanding the 1st Division, Maḥmud Salman, head of the 'Iraq Air Force, and Fahmi Sa'id, in charge of mechanized forces. These leaders were indignant at their subordination to a parvenu as Minister of Defence, and at recent promotions and dismissals little to their taste. They professed loyalty to their old Chief of Staff, Ṭaha al-Hashimi, carried with them the present Chief of Staff, Ḥusayn Fawzi, and other senior officers in an approach to Ṭaha—not without the knowledge of Nuri Pasha—and demanded a change of Government. Next, gathered at al-Rashid Camp, they dispatched a petition to the King requesting the formation of a Ministry under Ṭaha himself or under Nuri, and repeated the demand insistently to the President of the Royal Diwan, Rashid al-Khawja, whom King Ghazi sent to interview them. They had in the meanwhile stood their troops to arms, occupied key points in the city, and posted guards at the houses of Nuri and Ṭaha, fearing or pretending to fear their arrest and banishment. The case was simultaneously placed before the Prime Minister by a senior military spokesman, who indicated that neither civilians nor the Police were concerned in the movement. Satisfied after an interview with Nuri that order would be maintained, Madfa'i urged the generals to return to their proper duties, and himself, after a Cabinet meeting, resigned his office by letter to the King. Nuri Pasha, perhaps with the reluctance which he

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Nuri Pash, perhaps with the reluctance which he professed, accepted the premiership for the fifth time on Christmas Day 1938. 645x

2. DEATH OF THE KING

The new Ministry was greeted by the usual hopes for a firm and stable régime at last, the usual apprehension of faction, reprisal, and further military intervention. A Cabinet of average merit was announced; but once again no firm basis of shared principles was present to unite the ministers. Naji Shawkat was summoned from the 'Iraqi Legation at Ankara to be Minister of the Interior, Rustum Ḥaydar went to Finance, the capable Turkoman, 'Umar Nadhmi, to Works, Maḥmud Ṣubḥi al-Daftari to Justice, Ṣaliḥ Jabr to Education, Ṭaha al-Hashimi to Defence. Rashid 'Ālī was taken to preside over the Royal Diwan. The Prime Minister's inaugural speech was admirably balanced, wise, and high-minded; it deprecated military adventures and urged all parties to accept the rule of law and true democracy. The banned newspapers were relicensed, the exiled politicians returned. Postal censorship was abolished, dismissed officials were reinstated, and permission was given for the formation of political parties, though these failed for the moment to take shape. Words of mingled reproof and encouragement were addressed to assembled Euphrates shaykhs.

In Parliament, however, the usual asperities were not slow to repeat themselves, and redoubled after the departure of Nuri Pasha to London early in 1939. The exiled victims of the Madfa'i Ministry demanded vengeance for its high-handed illegalities, and as a first step pressed for reference of disputed points of law to the Special Court provided by the Organic Law; and the Ministry, itself indifferently united, decided to reinforce its position by general elections which might produce a more amenable Chamber. The Irada ordering the dissolution of Parliament appeared on 22 February, a few days before the State visit paid to Baghdad by the Crown Prince of Persia. 646 665

The return of the Prime Minister from London late in February was followed by the issue of a ministerial programme on the habitual lines. A few days later the discovery of a conspiracy was announced, understood to involve not only Ḥikmat Sulayman—the *bête noire* of Nuri Pasha—but a formidable list of other politicians and officers. The plot, it was revealed, had aimed at the murder of no less than fifty leading personalities, the assassination of the King, and the enthronement of his first cousin, the Amir 'Abd al-Ilah—or, as some preferred, of the Amir Zayd. A State of Emergency was immediately proclaimed at al-Rashid Camp, a number of arrests were made, and a special court martial was convened with civilian judges as equal members with the military. On the strength of 645x 669

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

19,000 in 1945, largely by the addition of nearly 5,000 men to the Mobile Force. In the Social services the tendency was still towards such limited development and improvement of the personnel as was feasible, though budget allotments to Education were reduced to a third, and those of the Health service to a quarter, of the funds made available for Defence.

The release of the remaining 'Amara internees in mid-1944 and at intervals in 1945 made its contribution to the resurgent political activity of the time. The fourth member of the Golden Square, Ṣalaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh, was handed over by the Turks and hanged in September 1945. Naji Shawkat, captured in Italy, was brought to Baghdad and began to serve his sentence; Rashid 'Āli, refused entrance into Switzerland, contrived to reach Sa'udi Arabia by way of Lebanon and there, sheltered by the traditional Arab attitude to guests seeking sanctuary, could defy demands for extradition. The activity of the Baghdad press and the multiplication of its daily sheets from five to fourteen was both effect and partial cause of the reanimation of the political scene which had well begun before 8 May 1945, the date of the armistice with Germany. The old-fashioned catch-words of 'imperialism', 'the foreigner', and 'complete independence' reappeared in a thousand bitter leading articles, the situation in Palestine and Syria gave congenial topics, and the economic frustrations of the time—and indeed all of the nation's backwardness and inequalities—were, it appeared, the fault of nothing but the sinister machinations of the British. The demand for the re-formation of political parties was heard on every side, and with it the removal of all restrictions and the early revision of the Treaty with Great Britain as being no longer compatible with 'Iraq's present status.

Communism, never extinguished in Baghdad even when outlawed in 1938, gained ground perceptibly in the later war years. Communists had supported Rashid 'Āli in 1941, but on the Nazi invasion of Russia had temporarily abandoned the anti-British for the Allied cause, and remained in the cities as a living though mainly clandestine force. One such organization was the League of 'Iraqi Communists which, catering for an educated membership, followed the lawyer Da'ud al-Ṣayigh; another, the 'Iraqi Communist Party under the Christian 'Comrade Fahad' (the Panther), alias Yusif Salman, produced the secretly-printed *al-Qa'ida* newspaper. The movement gained adherents in Kurdistan, where the proximity of the Russians in north-west Persia attracted the hopeful interest of anti-Arab nationalist students and of Aghās now learning to despair of British intervention on their behalf. It spread in Baghdad and the chief cities among the poor and thwarted (not least among the Assyrian, Armenian, and Jewish minorities),

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

least some of her statesmen. Her delegates attended the Food Conference at Hot Springs in May 1943, and the Bretton Woods meeting on Currency and Exchange questions in August 1944, the resulting agreement being ratified by Parliament late next year. The meetings at Atlantic City and at Chicago on Trade and on Civil Aviation respectively included 'Iraqi spokesmen, as well as the more important Conference at San Francisco in April 1945 at which the bases of the United Nations organization were laid. It was attended by Arshad al-'Umari, Foreign Minister, accompanied by Naṣrat al-Farsi, and by a young American-educated Shi'i official, Fadhil al-Jamali. The part taken by the delegation was creditable; but on the refusal of Arshad to subscribe to certain phraseology in the Charter (in which 'self-government' as distinct from 'independence' was given as the goal of countries under tutelage) Fadhil was authorized to sign instead, and his persistence cost Arshad his position as Foreign Minister. The World Security Charter was ratified by Parliament in October and in the Preparatory Commission which met in London late in the year the 'Iraqi chargé d'affaires, Shakir al-Wadi, a former staff officer of Bakr Ṣidqi, represented his country. It was contemporary with the inaugural meeting of the United Nations Cultural and Educational Organization, also held in London, at which Dr. Naji al-Aṣil, now Director of Antiquities, was present.

The Regent, a developing personality, generally popular, keenly interested in affairs and willing to play his full part in them, was now exercising an influence on Government greater than any Palace influence since the death of Faysal I. The Administration, whose continuity he helped to ensure, kept the peace, allowed wide latitude to the press and the bitter tirades of the ex-internees, and played a leading part in the Arab Unity movement; but it did little for social reform and refused, until its last month of power, to authorize the formation of political parties now struggling to birth. The Regent's speech at the opening of Parliament in December 1945, however, foreshadowed a new policy in this regard by promising the readmission of parties, the development of 'true democracy', a greater measure of equality and social justice, and the training of a younger element of citizens for power. This speech, welcome to the eager and half-thwarted political world—and disturbing to the elderly and privileged—led to increased criticism of the Pachachi Ministry in Parliament, and to clashes between the left wing of Kamil al-Chadirchi and the extreme right, or ex-Nazi, following of Sami Shawkat. The latter now abandoned his appointment as Director-General of Social Affairs to form a National Revival Party. The Pachachi Ministry resigned at the end of January 1946.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ea. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

though streams of unwelcome propaganda were flowing in from the Republic of Mahabad (with Marshal Muṣṭafā high in its councils), Army units were stationed in readiness in frontier qadhās, and a memorandum of Kurdish appeal and protest had been handed to the Anglo-American Palestine Committee. An Army column visited Sinjar, but only minor clashes resulted. The air of dissatisfaction or menace which hung over the Holy Cities led to no overt trouble. Elsewhere in the towns, efforts made by the progressive or malicious to create labour unrest were successful in inspiring a railway strike in March, and a political general strike and demonstration was organized in May in protest against the Anglo-American report. It led to no breach of the peace; indeed the deputies themselves had cabled in February a protest to London against continued Jewish immigration into Palestine, and Fadhil Jamali had testified similarly to the Anglo-American Commission in Cairo. The Cabinet and the Regent sent further protests in May to the British Government, King George VI, and the American President.

That political demonstrations were now possible was owed to the Suwaydi (or the Regent's) policy of removing restrictions and permitting the rebirth of parties. The 'Amara concentration camp was closed; martial law, imposed in Baghdad and neighbouring districts in 1941, was at last removed; the Public Security Ordinance of 1940 was revoked, and press censorship abolished. This liberality was repaid by journalist ex-internees in the form of savage attacks on the Suwaydi Ministry, attacks reflecting both personal bitterness and the militant attitudes of the parties which plunged forthwith into full activity. If they were representative as ever rather of the dissatisfied and power-seeking than the satisfied and power-holding political and social groups, this was least true of the Liberal Party which, dormant since its foundation in 1939, now revived with a modest reform programme made attractive by an anti-British colouring; its members, not numerous, included Kamil al-Khudhayri, President of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce, and Sa'd Ṣaliḥ. It published the *Ṣawt al-Aḥrar* as its daily newspaper. The Independence Party, based on the old côterie of Rashid 'Āli and Yasin Pasha, brought up to date by accretions of students and malcontent intelligentsia, passed for right-wing nationalist and was guided by the Muthannā Club founder-member and Nazi sympathizer, Muḥammad Mahdi al-Kubba, and by the bitter xenophobes Fa'iq al-Samarrā'i and Ṣādiq Shanshal. The party, well organized and comparatively stable, based its foreign policy on unfriendliness to Turkey and to Great Britain but 'neutrality' towards Russia, with an anti-Hashimite and pro-Mufti leaning, and aspirations at home towards social reform; the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

665 668 *Liwā al-Istiqlal* was its press organ. Dr. Sami Shawkat's National Revival Party, with its paper *al-Iṣlaḥ*, was similar but less stable in its views, and even more violent in tone. The last of the left-wing parties was the National Democratic of Kamil al-Chadirchi, an ineffective leader but veteran left-wing champion, with Muḥammad Ḥadid, London-educated left-wing socialist of good standing, and Ḥusayn Jamil, an ex-judge of good family and reformist views; its newspaper was the *Ṣawt al-Ahali*, later *Ṣadā al-Ahali*. A party of social reform deriving from the old Ahali group of 1934, it drew its support largely from wealthy townsmen and young enthusiasts and directed its fire principally against the Western Powers and against the 'old gang' in ruling circles. Its official anti-Communist attitude did not preclude some approval of Russian policies, nor its national loyalties an anti-Hashimite bias. The party of National Union, which was dissolved in 1947, was on the borderline of Communism, and its paper *al-Siyasa* frankly subversive; its stalwarts were the American-educated printing-press proprietor, 'Abd al-Fattaḥ Ibrahim, and Nadhim al-Zahawi. In the same category fell the People's Party of the Communist 'Aziz Sharif, with its papers *al-Sha'b* and later *al-Waṭn*, suppressed in 1946 and 1947 respectively. The two parties last named amalgamated before their suppression into a Party of National Union. The avowedly Communist party of National Liberation under Muḥammad al-Shabibi and a group of Jewish Communists was refused the right to legalize itself but remained, with other groups of Yusif Salman and Da'ud al-Ṣayigh, fully active underground. Their members were drawn from industrial workers, from rich young men hiding behind ministers, and in general from the discontented or visionary of all classes. Their organization was widespread and efficient; it included cells in Government offices—though officials were forbidden by law to participate openly in politics—and in industrial enterprises. Sulaymaniya was their principal centre, where contact was easy with the trans-frontier Communists and the merging of Communism with Kurdish nationalism was an effective device.

648x Relations with 'Iraq's northern neighbour, always cordial with reservations, were amicably restated by a mission of Nuri Sa'id to Ankara in February 1946. He initialed a draft treaty of friendship which confirmed the 1926 boundary, provided a mutual policy of brotherhood, non-interference, and free consultation, and looked forward to joint handling of such shared problems as the Kurds and the Euphrates waters. The ratification of this in Baghdad in June 1947 was to prove no matter of course; some deputies remembered the old grievance of Alexandretta, others felt that to draw closer to Ankara must be disloyal to Arab interests, or that an

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

designed to obtain (by steps undecided and unspecified) Arab rights in Palestine and the French evacuation of Syria, the two States were feeling their way to a closer understanding in the political, cultural, and military fields. On the 'Greater Syria' plan of King 'Abdullah, which he urged with increasing openness after the War, 'Iraq's attitude was one of cautious avoidance of commitment, though individual statesmen in Baghdad were frank in their support. A visit by the King to Baghdad and Mosul late in 1946 advanced the cause of 'Iraq–Jordan solidarity, but not that of Greater Syria. 'Iraq meanwhile had taken its place at meetings at Cairo and at Bludan, and in the late summer of 1946 had dispatched its representatives to London for the would-be Round Table Conference on Palestine. Their attitude at it could not be in doubt; the general strike organized throughout 'Iraq on 2 November (Balfour Day) showed the continuing popular fervour against Zionism. A Legation was opened in the Yaman and wireless communication established between Baghdad and Ṣan'ā. The Government recognized the Indonesian Republic, had views on the disposal of ex-Italian North Africa, cordially supported an Egypt now in the throes of post-war negotiation with Britain, and was gratified by the election of a representative on the Trusteeship Council of United Nations. The Legation in London was raised to the status of an Embassy, to which the Amir Zayd was appointed. The British Ambassador at Baghdad announced his willing abandonment of his special right, under the 1930 Treaty, of precedence over other diplomats. The United States Legation became an Embassy.

An unexpected appeal repeated insistently during later 1946 reached Baghdad from the Arab tribes of Khuzistan. The low prestige of the Persian Government after the war in its outlying provinces, the conditions of near-anarchy produced by the Tudeh Party, and a resurgence of Arabism led the long-expatriated tribesmen of that Persian province to beg, in petitions addressed to Basra, Baghdad, and the Arab League, for the grant of 'Iraqi citizenship. An Arab State of Kuzistan was visualized, and the woes of these rightless Arabs became a theme of the parties in Baghdad; but no more was heard of the movement after the winter of 1946–7, and Perso-'Iraqi relations remained suspicious and irritable in spite of common interest in the menace of Communism and the safeguarding of peace in Kurdistan and on the frontiers.

The forces hostile to 'Umari had by mid-November gained a strength which compelled his resignation. The formation of a coalition Ministry to conduct the elections was entrusted on 21 November to Nuri Sa'id. He formed his Cabinet, dissolved Parliament, and prepared for elections under the new procedure

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH

with the promise of full freedom of choice. But his hopes of securing a strong Chamber and satisfied parties by inviting their co-operation were but partially gratified; the Liberals and National Democrats, invited to name representatives for Cabinet posts, did so in the persons of 'Ali Mumtaz at the Ministry of Works and Muḥammad Ḥadid at that of Supply; but both these and two Shi'i ministers, Ṣaliḥ Jabr at Finance and Ṣādiq Baṣṣam at Education, resigned their offices in the following month to devote themselves to an election campaign. Most of the parties, including Ṣaliḥ Jabr's parliamentary Political Bloc, took part and one, the unauthorized National Liberation Party, was the cause of a scuffle with the police at Kadhimiya. The Cabinet was, with consequent changes, reformed to include 'Abd al-Hadi al-Chalabi at Works, 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh at Supply and temporarily at Finance, Shakir al-Wadi (reputed to be in the close confidence of the Regent) at Defence, Babā 'Ali at Economics, Jamil 'Abd al-Wahhab at Social Affairs and for a time at Education, Fadhil Jamali at Foreign Affairs, and 'Umar Nadhmi at Justice.

The conduct of the elections, which began in February, did not prevent Nuri Pasha from locating hotbeds of Communism and claiming by his arrests and searches to have suppressed them. The followers of Yusif Salman and Da'ud al-Ṣayigh were involved, and from these or other groups such leaders as Ibrahim Naji Shummal, Zaki Muḥammad Baṣim, and two score of their associates were arrested. With the exposure of the Communist cells in every liwā, the Premier could hope that a fatal blow had been dealt to the movement; but gratitude for this did little to diminish the fury of press attacks on himself and on targets provided by the British, notably Reuter's Agency and local branches of the British Council.

The Chamber of Deputies which, amid the usual outcries against 'Government interference', emerged from the elections, showed a large majority of independent members or supporters of Nuri and of Ṣaliḥ Jabr. The National Democratic Party secured five seats, the other parties none. When Parliament opened Nuri, who had accepted the premiership on this understanding, now made way for Ṣaliḥ Jabr, and was ready to support a Ministry led by him—the first to be formed under a Shi'i Premier. Ṣaliḥ reserved for himself the Ministry of the Interior and relied upon experienced colleagues in the other appointments: he retained Jamali, Shakir al-Wadi, 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh, and Jamil 'Abd al-Wahhab in their former posts, and brought Jamal Baban to Justice and temporarily to Economics, Ghanima to Finance, the Kurdish scholar Tawfiq Wahbi to Education, the Shi'i Dhiyā' Ja'far—a Birmingham graduate in oil engineering—to Works. The Opposition,' itself fragmentary, was formed mainly by the five parties not represented

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the Prime Minister and the Regent both visited London during the year. The objectives of all politicians (save only the vehement minority who would break every form of British connexion) were the removal of all limitation to their independence and free choice, the end of all treatment of the country as a junior partner, and the abolition of provisions which, offensively to their *amour propre*, left Habbaniya and Shu'ayba as British cantonments in the heart of 'Iraq. The early negotiations with the British Ambassador appeared to run smoothly, and the Ministry could hope that early 1948 would see a happy solution. Newspaper attacks on Great Britain, unhelpful in these circumstances, were as ever the commonplace of every journalist, and were suspended only in part and temporarily in the summer of 1947, when a party of 'Iraqi editors visited London.

In the two years following the armistice most of the remaining British officials of the Administration—a tiny remnant of the body so active and so hopeful in 1919–20—left 'Iraq. Edmonds had retired in 1945, succeeded in Interior by A. H. Ditchburn. In 1946 Drower of Justice, Sinderson of the Medical Services, Atkinson of Irrigation, Caparn of Communications and Works, H. I. Lloyd of the Date Board, and Grice of Interior were among the losses sustained by the Government. They were followed next year by Swan of Finance, Seton Lloyd of Antiquities, and Chadwick of the Veterinary Department.

It was regrettable that Salih Jabr's best-meaning of Governments was compelled, like its predecessors, to take steps against press and party agitation which passed all reasonable limits. Its Palestine policy was more than correct, its moves towards Treaty revision active and popular; but this was not enough. Exclusion from power and sheer hatred of the 'old gang'—and of the British allegedly behind them—still led the parties to frenzies of anti-Government zeal. A newspaper was suppressed in April, and two more in June. Kamil al-Chadirchi and 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim were charged with sedition. The premises of the People's Party were seized and 'Aziz Sharif arrested, but released. Trials of Communists detained under the last Sa'idi Ministry, some months ago, led to a score of long sentences of imprisonment and to death sentences[1] on Yusif Salman, Zaki Basim, and Naji Shummal for inciting troops and police against the State; these were later commuted to long terms of imprisonment. Baghdad bookshops were raided and the premises of the more extreme parties searched.

[1] The *Daily Worker*'s later (17 February 1949) description of the 'Iraq Government was that of a 'corrupt and murderous puppet of British imperialism'; *L'Humanité* (8 February 1949) attributed 'Iraq's anti-Communist steps to 'the Anglo-American millionaires who are preparing war'.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The People's Party and that of National Union were finally suppressed in October for preaching sedition and rebellion. It was notorious that the strike in the Port of Basra during the summer had been Communist-organized, an activity of the illegal but vigorous Party of National Liberation and the Anti-Zionist League.

But no preoccupation of the Government and public during 1947 equalled that of the absorbing and saddening Palestine Question. If its appeal was less to the northern areas and to Shi'i circles and those of the minorities, the problem of Arab survival in Palestine against the threat of rich, ubiquitous, and ably directed Zionism, backed by American money and competing political interest (and supported by strong elements in Britain), excelled all others in the eyes of more and wider elements than any other foreign issue could interest. It aroused sincere and bitter sentiment as showing, it was felt, the full picture of Western injustice and cynicism, and it united all parties in a dangerous atmosphere of anti-European emotion. The London Conference of the autumn of 1946 and early 1947, attended by Fadhil Jamali, reached no agreement except in rejecting the compromise 'Morrison Plan' which had succeeded to the inept unrealities of the Anglo-American Commission. Early in 1947 a Bevin Plan for Partition was equally rejected, and the Palestine problem was referred by Great Britain to the United Nations, whose Sub-Committee of Five toured Palestine during the summer. After an infinity of intrigues and pressures at Lake Success in the autumn of the year the General Assembly, warned of Great Britain's intention to withdraw from Palestine in the absence of an agreed settlement, took its decision in November to divide Palestine finally into Jewish and Arab areas; the Mandate was to end, British troops to withdraw, Arab and Jewish States to come into existence, and a special régime to be established for Jerusalem.

The passage of a year of general outward tranquillity in 'Iraq, a creditable body of legislation passed or submitted, and some sound measures carried out—one of which was the first serious Census—concealed at the time the true force of the factors of discontent and potential violence which were actually present and were gaining strength. When Parliament was opened on 1 December the poorer classes, already seriously short of bread, were approaching desperation. The country was empty of food stocks. Militant Communists were still active, and eager to use present discontents for their objective of anarchy. The small but zealous political parties—anti-traditionalist, anti-British and largely anti-Western, narrowly and unrealistically 'nationalist'—were less powerless in mob-rousing than the orthodox or the complacent

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

668 judged them; nor were they incapable of temporary union with
665 each other or, in some eventualities, with the Communists. General disillusion created by the divided post-war world, the uneasy relations between East and West from China to Morocco, and the doubtful progress of 'democracy', had descended upon the conscious elements of the 'Iraq cities; and the destructive emotions it had produced were to find their readiest outlet in two fields: one, the Palestine situation now going from bad to worse: the other, the relations of 'Iraq with Great Britain now on the eve of restatement. All the latent menaces of 1947, a year of seeming progress and hope, were to be realized with tragic results in the year following.

2. PORTSMOUTH AND PALESTINE

648 K During the weeks following the opening of Parliament on 1 December 1947 all was ready, it seemed, for the signature of a new Treaty; not only its principles but most of a new text had been agreed by the statesmen consulted in Baghdad and by the Regent. In the last days of the year it was announced that the Premier and his Foreign Minister—to be accompanied, in the event, by Nuri Sa'id and Shakir al-Wadi—would proceed to London for final talks and probable signature. Jamal Baban was left as acting Prime Minister. The Treaty was in fact agreed and initialed on 12 January 1948, and was signed at Portsmouth by the 'Iraqi deputation and Ernest Bevin on the 15th.

Praised by the latter as an inspiring example and precedent for other similar undertakings, the Treaty and its annex included the hope of co-operation in matters of technical and economic development; but primarily it was one of mutual defence. It provided for consultation in time of danger, and for immediate help, each to each, in time of war. The Air Force bases of Habbaniya and Shu'ayba were to be handed to 'Iraq, with the retention only of limited British personnel, at British expense but under 'Iraqi command, to ensure readiness for immediate use; British combatant forces could reoccupy them only in case of war. The British Military Mission was to disappear, a mixed Anglo-'Iraqi Council would undertake the development of strategic plans and offer recommendations on the equipment of the 'Iraqi forces. Standardization of equipment as between the two armies would be assured, help would be given by the R.A.F. to the R.I.A.F. in training abroad, arms of the latest pattern would be made available. The Treaty would come into force as soon as the post-war world had returned to peace conditions: as soon, that is, as all peace treaties with ex-enemy countries had come into force and occupying armies had been withdrawn.

The Treaty as published was welcomed in Great Britain, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 579 Mutaṣarrifs protested to the Minister of Interior at the military reign of terror in their liwās and forced the resignation of the Minister of Defence, Ṣādiq Baṣṣam. The arrest of the Chief Rabbi and the conviction and hanging of a rich Jewish merchant, Shafiq Adis—but not of his Muslim associates—was disapproved by much of the public. The press was allowed full freedom to attack the British as having created all the troubles of Palestine as well as of 'Iraq: to call the oil companies truculently to account: and to assail with rage the well-reasoned pamphlet which Nuri Sa'id issued, on his return home at midsummer, in justification of the Portsmouth Treaty.

*645 The reinstatement of the Treaty supporters was, indeed, a feature of these months; Ṣaliḥ Jabr was welcomed back to Baghdad in July, Nuri could re-enter politics in the same summer, Shakir al-Wadi succeeded Baṣṣam as Minister of Defence in October, Jamali was sent as Minister to Cairo, and all were once again candidates for high office by the end of the year. Party activity was limited by the abnormal conditions, and the National Democrat and the Liberal Parties, both handicapped by shortage of funds, complained of undue restriction and ceased active operation in December. The Independence Party remained vigorous. A series of Cabinet changes was made in October, after months in which portfolios passed from hand to hand among acting ministers. Shakir al-Wadi came to Defence, 'Umar Nadhmi to Interior, and 'Ali Jawdat from Washington to Foreign Affairs. Muḥammad al-Sayhud, Amir al-Rabi'a, rejoined the Cabinet as minister without portfolio, and Muṣṭafā al-'Umari, who while under medical treatment in London gave up his post at Interior but remained in the Cabinet, resigned a month later. 'Ali Mumtaz, resigning from Finance in November, was replaced after an interval by the experienced Director-General of Customs, Khalil Isma'il, and 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan on becoming President of the Chamber was succeeded at Economics by 'Ali Ḥaydar Sulayman, the Minister of Social Affairs. Najib al-Rawi, Minister of Education and 'Iraqi representative at Lake Success, returned home. The Speech from the Throne on 1 December, when Parliament met, was politically colourless.

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The Pachachi Ministry, clearly unable to master its manifold problems, survived the last weeks of 1948 only by the support of the Portsmouth Treaty-makers, Nuri Sa'id and Ṣaliḥ Jabr. Muzaḥim's favour of Egypt as the strongest Arab Power and his favourable response to interventionist demonstrations on 30 and 31 December clashed with Army views—indeed, with those of every realist—and created an impasse from which a change of Government was the only outlet. He resigned office on 6 January 1949.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The Regent, himself indefatigable in touring the country and visiting the Army and the Arab capitals, called upon Nuri Sa'id to form a new Ministry. He did so on the same day by retaining four of the outgoing ministers—Kubba at Justice, Rawi at Education, Jalal Baban at Works, Shakir at Defence—and by bringing Bahā al-Din Nuri to Social Affairs, Dhiya' Ja'far to Economics, and 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh to Foreign Affairs. He retained Interior himself, and asked Jalal Baban to act temporarily in Finance until Khalil Isma'il reassumed the post.

Mainly through lack of mutual confidence between the Premier, some of the ministers, and the Throne, the ministerial history of 1949 was troubled in spite of improved leadership. The Cabinet, initially weak, was little strengthened by changes made two months later when 'Umar Nadhmi entered the Cabinet as Deputy Premier, Fadhil Jamali came from Cairo to Foreign Affairs on the appointment of 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh to direct the National Bank, and Tawfiq al-Na'ib, a former judge and Mutaṣarrif and a supporter of Ṣalih Jabr, became Minister of the Interior. The Prime Minister hoped at midsummer to secure further strength in support of a Ministry which its own dissensions were destroying. He consulted Jamil al-Madfa'i, Ṣalih Jabr, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, and 'Ali Mumtaz, of whom the last two were expected to join him; but agreement on the appointments was not forthcoming and the Cabinet barely survived into the winter of 1949–50. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Interior, not being deputies, were forced under the Constitution to resign office after six months, and their places were taken in September by Shakir and 'Umar Nadhmi.

Taking advantage of the partial lull in party activity while only the Independence Party was in full operation, Nuri Pasha decided late in the year to found his own party, that of Constitutional Union. With an unexceptional programme of Arab brotherhood, friendship to all nations, anti-Communism, Treaty revision, and progress to national greatness at home and abroad, the party was composed of various elements of conservatism and vested interest, tribal and urban, and found cohesion in a common devotion to Nuri himself—as long as he remained powerful; and, taking its place as by far the largest and most amenable of the parties, it could not but dominate the Chamber as long as it held together. It was joined by an imposing array of ex-ministers and *ministrables*.

The last act of the Pachachi Ministry had been to arrange yet another drive against the Communists, and the first of the Sa'idi Cabinet was to continue it. Some hundreds of arrests were made, and led to scores of severe sentences for sedition and treason. Four notorious Communists—Yusif Salman, Yahuda Ṣadiq, Zaki Baṣim, and Ḥusayn Muhammad Shabibi (a Christian, a Jew, and two

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

American 'military aid' assistance, and was visited by the British Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. The Mutaṣarrifs, after a slow start, began before the end of 1950 seriously to use the powers which were theirs under the Liwā Administration Law, and provincial administration, it could be hoped, would show henceforth a picture of livelier initiative as greater funds became available. Manifestations of local Communism were less evident, and when they appeared were suppressed by police action; but its vitality was still clear in the tone of press articles, in the streets and meetings in Sulaymaniya, and in busy if temporarily invisible cells among the Port, railway, and oil company workers. Its most formidable strength lay among these and among the bitter and dissatisfied young politicians who despaired of social reform for the people, or advancement for themselves, unless by revolution: who distrusted and indeed detested the Western Powers for their Palestine policies and their seeming support of conservatism: and who advocated a policy of strict international neutrality, if not of positive adhesion to the Russian bloc—a policy strong in its appeal to considerable elements other than Communist. When the Korean war forced the Arab States to define their position between the two world groups, 'Iraq followed the majority of the League members in approving the Western Powers' resistance, but unlike Turkey offered no practical help; if Northern Korean invaders were to be withstood, why had not Zionist?

If the question of the international attitude to be adopted was a main cause of division in Baghdad, there were others. The dilemma of the 'Iraqi Jews, many of whom had braved the law by escaping from the country in 1948 and 1949 and more had followed when martial law ceased, was met by a law of March 1950. Strongly attacked in the Senate, it permitted these departures with forfeiture of 'Iraqi nationality and with the right for each emigrant to take a mere 50 dinars from the country. By the end of 1950, 90,000 Jews had registered their names to leave the territory, and 20,000 had already left. The transport supplied was that of an American air transport company, who enjoyed a monopoly by arrangement with the Jewish Agency. The attitude of Government, once it had established this policy, was to urge more and faster departures, and popular voices were heard (but not officially countenanced) advocating concentration camps or expulsion for such Jews as remained. Indeed, with the loss of their position in officialdom—even where, as in Telegraphs and Railways, they were with great difficulty replaced by imported Pakistanis—and of equal rights and opportunities in commerce, even the remnant of the ancient community could look to no hopeful future in 'Iraq. Nevertheless some thousands elected to remain, including many of the most

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

eminent; and many who reached Palestine bitterly regretted their change of home.

An episode in the Chamber on 7 March, early in the Suwaydi Ministry's life, led to the resignation—in despair, they said, of fair parliamentary treatment—of the whole body of deputies opposed to Nuri Sa'id's Constitutional Union Party who in fact maintained the Ministry in power and dominated the Chamber. The gesture was regrettable as ending all pretence of government on party lines; but the sympathy accorded to the retiring members did not survive their own squabbles and evident lack of common purpose, and the elections held early in June to fill their places produced amenable members. No considerable Opposition elements remained thereafter in the Chamber, before which stretched a life of two or three more years. But within the Cabinet a tripartite balance of power was uneasily maintained between the Prime Minister, the supporters of Nuri Pasha (himself absent), and those of Ṣaliḥ Jabr; between the latter two statesmen the old cordiality was fast disappearing, and Ṣaliḥ Jabr's share in building the party itself was little remembered. The Prime Minister was by midsummer maintaining himself with difficulty; favourite projects of his own, such as a new press law, were frustrated by his colleagues. The absence of the Regent and of Nuri in London precluded a change of Ministry until the autumn, but on 12 September Suwaydi was forced to resign.

Four days later the formation of an eleventh Sa'idi Ministry was proclaimed. Even in the process of its establishment Nuri found something of Suwaydi's difficulty in reconciling personalities each in itself valuable; he could not use simultaneously both Tawfiq and Ṣaliḥ Jabr, and preferred for the moment to be content with a skeleton Cabinet which he proposed to strengthen and broaden as opportunity might offer into a real Ministry of National Union intended, as he announced, for urgent economic and administrative work. As it was, he kept the post of Interior in his own hands, combined Defence and Foreign Affairs under Shakir al-Wadi, Works and Finance under 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan, and gave the Ministries of Justice, Education, Social Affairs, and Economics respectively to Ḥasan Sami Tatar, Khalil Kunna, Mājid Muṣṭafā, and Ḍhiya' Ja'far. But it became early apparent that the breach with the followers of Ṣaliḥ Jabr was widening; and the latter, in whom many observers recognized Nuri's ultimate successor, founded early in 1951 his own Socialist Party of the Nation, a group generally conservative (in spite of its singularly ill-chosen name) and, while largely personal to Ṣaliḥ, relying also on organized Shi'ism and seeking Kurdish support. The Iṣlaḥ Party of Sami Shawkat merged itself in the new group. At the same time

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

645 665 opposition leaders of various records and tendencies—Ṭaha al-Hashimi, Muzaḥim al-Pachachi, Muḥammad Riḍhā al-Shabibi, Naṣrat al-Farsi, 'Abd al-Hadi al-Ḍhahir, Ja'far Ḥamandi, and Ṣādiq Baṣṣam—were drawing together towards a fragile but imposing Popular Front whose formation with a vague programme they announced towards the middle of 1951. The National Democrat Party returned to full activity during 1950. There seemed, however, no reason why, with his parliamentary majority and with a personal authority which for years past had exceeded that of any other 'Iraqi, Nuri Sa'id should not, subject to unforeseeable changes and chances, remain in power as long as his health and restless nature might permit. In the last days of 1950 he brought 'Umar Nadhmi, Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Kubba, and Baṣṣam to the Cabinet as Ministers without portfolio, appointed 'Abd al-Majid Maḥmud, the Director of the Agricultural Bank, to the Ministry of Economics, moved Ḍhiya' Ja'far to Works, and retained 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan at Finance. But no real coalition had emerged, and internal politics showed no sign of rising above the habitual strife of riv:' personalities. A formidable range of unsolved problems, inter-Arab and international, political and financial, confronted Nuri Sa'id, none more conspicuously than those of Israel and the Palestine refugees, revision of the 1930 Treaty, and the extraction of greater oil profits. To these the veteran statesman now turned.

643 King Faysal II, whose fifteenth birthday fell on 2 May 1950, had completed his preparatory school days in England and since the spring of 1949 had been a happy and successful Harrow schoolboy. He was to attain his majority on 2 May 1953. His family had acquired a house near Staines where the Queen Mother 'Aliya spent most of the year. Her health, however, began to cause alarm in 1949 and after a long illness and operation she returned home to die in Baghdad in September 1950, aged only thirty-nine; a tragic loss to the King and to her devoted brother, the Regent.

4. WEALTH OF A NATION

652 There have been references on earlier pages to the serious position of the State finances in the period 1947–9 and to the substantial recovery therefrom by the end of 1950. It could be foreseen by the latter date that, so far from financial stringency, the resources at the Government's disposal would in future be ample not only for normal purposes of the public services as hitherto conceived but also for an expanding programme of development. Provided that control of expenditure were maintained as efficiently as it had been (except in 1948) in the past, which there was no reason to doubt: that the probity and efficiency of Government personnel did not deteriorate: that the efforts made to perfect the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

642 day. It did not regard itself as the battleground of rival policies, nor, as under the Constitution it should be, as the arbiter of Ministries which, on the contrary, enjoyed an almost independent existence. At the same time by their manner of two-stage Government-controlled election, and by the wide gulf between most of the deputies and their constituents, the activity of the former was almost independent of the electorate: a position reflecting not so much defects in the Constitution as the backwardness of an illiterate electorate capable neither of exercising an enlightened free choice in selecting its spokesmen, nor of controlling them when selected. And even should the political parties occupy the Mutaṣarrif's place as the effective selectors of deputies, and electoral processes be basically altered (as opposition parties ceased not to demand), this situation in its essentials must still subsist for many years.

665 The working of parliamentary democracy which had been imposed on 'Iraq in its political infancy has seemed everywhere to demand responsible parties to represent rival policies and therewith to contend for power. But these in 'Iraq, in a form adequate to their task, did not exist. These pages have indeed made many references to the parties which, after some years' intermission, came into existence in 1946 or thereafter. They were, by 1951, responsible for the greatest part of specifically political activity in the country, and their scale and perhaps their permanence had to some degree increased by comparison with their predecessors of a generation earlier. The parties active at the mid-century, if we ignore the illegal Communist Party still working in the shadows, were five in number. One[1] of these, a party in little more than name, seemed to stand less for a policy or principle than for the personalities and hopes of a miscellaneous group of ex-ministers not unwilling to reappear in office. Two[2] of the parties, appealing to the more progressive elements in urban educated or intelligentsia circles, advocated rapid advance along many lines, with emphasis as ever on complete independence, neutrality, and social and cultural reform; they had a militant and indeed an over-violent press, and were able at times to arouse, but not to control, the emotion of the mob; but they had no considerable support from the mass of citizens. The two remaining parties were those of Nuri Sa'id (p. 355) and of Ṣaliḥ Jabr (p. 363), both standing for a mixed and various body of the possessing and substantially satisfied classes including notables, landowners, shaykhs, and their respec-

[1] The United Popular Front of Ṭaha al-Hashimi (pp. 364 and 389). It showed, late in 1951, signs of disintegration.

[2] The National Democratic Party of Kamil al-Chadirchi and the Independence Party of Muḥammad Mahdi Kubba and Fa'iq Samarri'i (pp. 335 and 336).

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

tive followings. Both, while moderately reformist and relatively responsible, were founded less on a body of agreed principles than on the personalities of their leaders, on their hopes of freedom from disturbance and on a natural fear of sudden and unpredictable changes. The official programmes of all the parties were of remarkable similarity; the blending of ambition and personal self-seeking with idealism and high principle was perhaps not greatly different in each; some had few, some had no provincial branches, though the two last mentioned were by far the widest in extent of support; all recited the greatest blessings which, in the whole field of national life, they would desire for their people, and stated these to be their programme. Party bitterness was nourished chiefly by the impatient resentment of the Independents and the National Democrats at the continued dominance of the satisfied property-owning and power-possessing strata of politics, with their penchant for the West and Great Britain, their restrictions on the press, their control (through the executive) of elections, and their irritating failure to produce the millennium forthwith. Between the moral level and the patriotic sincerity of all parties there was probably little to choose. Most leaders and writers were both less violent and more persuasive when in private conversation they substituted reasonable grievances and much social charm for the meaningless and often crudely false rhetoric of their speeches or leading articles. Nuri Pasha remained the only statesman of international stature, and one of the very few to have profited from a full generation of realistic experience at home and abroad.

In the probable absence for many years of political parties based on genuinely differing yet practicable programmes, and on country-wide organizations making them reasonably representative of the electorate, it was difficult in 1950 not to anticipate that Cabinet Government would long continue, and with it the rootless precariousness of a régime which seemingly at any time a successful intrigue, or a military coup d'état of too familiar a pattern, could subvert.

Constitutional or political weaknesses apart, there were, it appeared, other factors present which must preclude easy optimism as to that sole condition for the fulfilment of all the country's hopes —the stability and continuity of its Government. The first of these factors was the unchanged Arab character which, with all its charm, intelligence, and responsive sympathy, is by its impatience and its rejection of give-and-take peculiarly ill adapted to the stresses, the restraints, and the needed compromises of modern politics and Government. The second was the nature of local nationalism which, violent and narrow, suspicious and over-sensitive, self-praising and unrealistic, had lost nothing of the

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The convening of Parliament at Constantinople also encouraged 'Iraqī Nationalists by bringing them into contact with the ardent Nationalists of other parts of the Empire, who, in spite of the great care with which the C.U.P. had conducted the elections, found seats in the Chamber. With them the 'Iraqis made common cause in the Moderate Liberal party, founded by Prince Sabah-ed-Dīn in opposition to the C.U.P., and later in the *Itilāf* or Coalition party. These parties were not merely sectional groups, although the 'Iraqī branches of the former, founded in Basra and Baghdad in August and September, 1911, were known in 'Iraq as the *Hurr-i-Mū'tadīl*, while branches of the *Itilāf* to which the Moderate Liberal party gave way in early 1912 were known as *Hurrīya wa Itilāf*. The organization of the parties extended throughout the Empire, the branch in Basra, for instance, being formed by Saiyid Talib Pasha in obedience to a telegram sent by a person unknown.

In the years 1910 and 1911, 'Iraqī feeling also sought means of outlet through the press. In these two years were established 36 Arabic newspapers or 60 per cent of the 61 founded in 'Iraq during the period 1904 to 1914; 22 or nearly 40 per cent being started in 1911 alone.[1] Of these, 19 were established in Baghdad. In the same 2 years, were founded 6 of the 9 magazines established in the same period of 1904 to 1914. A number of these papers were periodically suppressed by the Turks, after which the owners reissued them under new names.

In the years 1912 and 1913, the movement firmly established itself in 'Iraq. The British Resident in Baghdad in an official report in early 1912 stated:

> I have been much struck of late by the increasing freedom with which anti-C.U.P. and anti-Turkish sentiments are expressed here. Hitherto this was regarded as treason to the State . . . This growing political confidence of non-Turkish Muhammadan elements is noticeable even among officials. . . . It is clear also that the eldest son of the *Kiliddar* of Najaf

[1] Based on Tarazi, op. cit.

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immediately asked for a ship of war for the protection of British interests.[1] H.M.S. *Alert* arrived at Basra on May 4th. Saiyid Talib, however, finding that Shaikh Ajaimī had moved with his Muntafiq tribesmen towards Basra with the intention of supporting the Government and that a new Wilayet Law had been promulgated, agreed on May 12th to press Arab demands with moderation.

The new Wilayet Law, together with an official circular from the Ministry of Interior conceding wide official use of Arabic in 'Iraq, had supposedly granted self-government on paper, but neither Saiyid Talib nor other Arab leaders were misled as to its real nature. The new law, if ever applied, which they doubted, still kept real power in the hands of the *Walī* or Governor, while they had in mind actual participation by Arabs in the Government. In spite of the momentary check to the Nationalists at Basra, the Arabs elsewhere redoubled their efforts to obtain the full measure of their demands.

The Arab Movement had developed faster in Basra than in Baghdad, due to the efforts of Talib Pasha, but Nationalism was not lacking in strength in the latter city. In closer contact than Basra with the Nationalist Movement at Constantinople and among the Syrians and Egyptians, the Baghdad Nationalists had divided themselves into four groups. One section consisted of partisans of Saiyid Talib and the Basra Nationalists. Another looked to Syria for leadership and assistance. Still another group was in correspondence with Egypt, from which it was rumoured that the Khedive would be elected King and *Khalīfa* of the Muslims. The fourth group formed a separate Baghdad party, relying chiefly on their own efforts and on their own leaders. These groups, however, were without hard and fast lines, and in the spring of 1913, when a concerted effort was made to unite the Arabs of 'Iraq, Syria and Egypt in presenting demands to Constantinople, the groups apparently sank their differences and began to work together. The local secret

[1] *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, May, 1913.

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Patriotic Society, formed in 1912 to expel the Turks and to establish autonomous government, had as members the principal Arabs, including more than a hundred Arab officers of all ranks. Manifestos and literature from Basra and Constantinople attacking the Turkish Government circulated in the city. Placards appeared on the walls of Baghdad, as on March 18th, exhorting Arabs to rise against their oppressors and to demand autonomy or decentralization. The reforms announced in April and May were dismissed as being inadequate. The newspapers *Bain an-Nahrain* and *al-Misbāh*[1] took courage and demanded further reforms and decentralization. A delegate, Taufīq as-Sūwaidī, son of Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, an outstanding leader in the Movement, was nominated to the first Arab Congress held in Paris, June 18th, 1913. Even more significant was the growing hostility between the Turkish and the Arab officers of the 13th Army Corps in the Baghdad Barracks, and between the Turkish and Arab civil officials of the Wilayet.[2]

The Turks were not inactive in the face of these manifestations of Arab feeling. Arab teachers and *mullas* were appointed to advocate faithfulness to the Government, inspired articles appeared in the Press,[3] and reforms were promised. Spies were increased and following a search in Baghdad by the police for a supposed emissary of Egyptian and Syrian Nationalists, a sudden arrest of Arab leaders was made, June 14th. Among them were: Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, Saiyid Kāmil Effendi, proprietor of the suppressed *Bain an-Nahrain*, Shukrī Effendi and Salmān Effendi. Mahmūd Effendi, editor of *Bain an-Nahrain*, was also

[1] Founded in Baghdad by Muhammad Kāmil, December 9th, 1909, and by 'Abdul Husain al-'Uzrī, March 7th, 1911.

[2] *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, March to October, 1913, *passim*.

[3] *Al-Zuhūr* (Baghdad) published the following, March 14th, 1913, under the heading 'Decentralization':

'Some Muhammadans want decentralization. They ought to know that decentralization is not permissible according to the Muhammadan Law because the centre of the whole Islamic world is the town of the *Khalīfa*. Christians are said to be making great progress by means of decentralization, but Muslims must recollect that Christians have three Gods and can, therefore, have more than one centre. Muslims, having only one God, can have but one centre.'

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Kamāl and now awaited a final blow at 'Āna at the hands of the Arabs led by the Sharīf 'Abdullāh, filled the Syrian newspapers and circulated in the coffee shops of Baghdad, Mōsul and every town in the land.

Nowhere was the anti-British feeling engendered by these activities more apparent than in Mōsul and in the surrounding country. In Mōsul during 1919, striking progress had been made under British administration. Public security was vastly improved, taxation equalized, the city so cleansed that the transformation appeared miraculous to those who had known it in pre-war days.[1] Education had been encouraged and medical treatment had been extended to all.[2] Trade had been stimulated and a return of prosperity seemed imminent. Nevertheless, it was evident that ready acquiescence by the Muslims in British Administration was being rendered extremely difficult by the general acceptance of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, by the delay in signing the peace treaty with Turkey, by the existence of an Arab State in Syria and by the claims of Islam and of self-interest.[3] Indications had not been lacking of the activities of the Nationalist society, *Al-'Ahd al-'Irāqīya*, which had been introduced, it was said,[4] by Jamīl Beg Midfai, a native of Mōsul and a member of Amīr Faisal's staff,[5] and by 'Ibrāhīm Kamāl Beg when they visited Mōsul in March, 1919.

Following the occupation of Dair az-Zūr by the Damascus Government and the appointment of the violently anti-British *Mudīr* to Mayyādīn, the society gave open manifestation of its hostility to the British Administration in the form of meetings and in the posting of anti-government notices, ranging in subject from obscene abuse to well-written proclamations calling

[1] See Sykes, Sir Mark, *The Caliph's Last Heritage* (1915), p. 3389.
[2] *Admin. Report*, 1919, *Mesopotamia*, Part 1, Mōsul, p. 32.
[3] Ibid., pp. 7, 8.
[4] *Admin. Report, Mosul Division*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1921), p. 3.
[5] As leader of the attack on Tall 'Afar, he was excluded from the amnesty of 1921. He was pardoned in April, 1922, and has been three times Prime Minister of 'Iraq as well as Minister of Interior, Minister of Defence, etc.

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upon Arabs to rise and die for their fatherland. For the most part, *Al-'Ahd* seemed to be composed of young men: doctors, lawyers, schoolmasters (a number of whom had been dismissed in the winter of 1919 for too violently proclaiming their anti-British sentiments) and the like. Nevertheless, while the members may have been unimportant individually, collectively they were important. The moderates, as is usually the case, held their peace and remained passive. *Al-'Ahd*, on the other hand, being well organized and having definite aims, gained the ear of the populace.[1]

It became evident that the society in Mōsul was in contact with members of the parent society in Dair az-Zūr and beyond, and that the Mōsulīs were prepared to rise should any opportunity be given them by the Sharifian forces. In late March, 1920, the first definite reports that the Arab Government intended to attack Mōsul were received and throughout April and May the tension increased. Outside Mōsul, the Shammar Jarba under 'Ajīl al-Yawar, Michal al-Fāris Bunaiyan, Hamaidī and others, the Khābūr Jūbūr under Muslat, the 'Albū Nimr, the 'Aqaidāt and other tribes[2] were rendering life and property unsafe. From April onwards, the concentration of tribal raids on military supply-camps and on military convoys between the Shargat rail-head and Mōsul pointed to other purposes than mere desire for loot, and to a higher control than that of tribal shaikhs. The methods employed seemed to indicate that the former officers of Faisal's Arab Army had not forgotten the tactics used by Colonel Lawrence and his fellow officers against the Turkish lines of supply in the Hijāz and in Syria. Instead of

[1] The Society was admitted by the authorities to be extremely well organized (Ibid., p. 5). Not until late May was the Government able to identify definitely even a few of the leading members. Of the other two patriotic societies, the *Haras* (the continuation of the pre-war secret society) and the *Hillal*, nothing was known to the authorities except the names.

[2] For locale and strength of these tribes: *Note on Nomad Tribes*, by Major J. I. Eadie; *Note on Tribes and Shaikhs of 'Anah-Albu Kamal District*; *Arab Tribes of the Baghdad Wilayet*; *Note on Tribes for General Staff*; and *Handbook of Mesopotamia*, pp. 110 ff.

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Colonial Office that, in the event of a rising, which was confidentially to be expected, His Majesty disclaimed all responsibility. He begged the High Commissioner either to assume the conduct of administration or to give himself a free hand to direct affairs on such lines as he saw fit.

The High Commissioner immediately drafted a strong reply, pointing out the responsibility of the King in the situation. The letter was withheld, however, in order that it might not mar the approaching anniversary of King Faisal's accession.

[465] The two Nationalist political parties, *Hizb al-Watanī*,[1] (National Party), and *Hizb an-Nahdha*[2] (Renaissance Party), which, with the *Hizb al-Hurr*[3] (Independent Party), had been formed in early August to take part in the prospective elections,[4] thought the moment opportune to add their weight to the protests against the Mandate. At a joint meeting, on November 20th and 21st, under the presidency of Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, the parties drew up an address which they presented to the King.[5] The address culminated in three demands:

1. Immediate termination of the present policy and of British influence.
2. Selection of a Cabinet, members of which were to be sincere patriots, possessing the confidence of the people.
3. Suspension of treaty negotiations until the meeting of the constituent Assembly, its members having been freely elected.[6]

Arrangements were also made by the parties for a joint public protest on August 23rd at the anniversary celebration.[7]

On the morning of the 23rd, when the High Commissioner

[1] Programme: *Al-Mufid*, August 8th, 1922.
[2] *Al-'Iraq*, August 10th, 1922; Programme: *Al-Mufid*, August 21st, 1922.
[3] *Baghdad Times*, August 11th, 1922.
[4] The Law of Associations, under which the parties were strictly regulated had been approved, after much delay, by the Council on June 29th, and promulgated on July 2nd, 1922. *Compilation*, 1920-1923, pp. 56-8.
[5] *Al-Mufid*, August 22nd, 1922.
[6] *Al-Rāfidān* and *Al-Mufid*, June 23rd, 1922.
[7] *Al-'Iraq* and *Al-Mufid*, August 25th, 1922.

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'Iraqī viewpoints[1] and, in two cases, to alleged lack of confidence by Parliament[2] had unfortunate consequences. On the one hand, the smooth course of administration was interrupted by the change of administrative officials which usually accompanied the change of Ministry, and by the dislike of subordinate officials of assuming responsibility and initiative, never more evident than in the absence of a Minister. The fact that the dislocation was not greater may be attributed to the presence of British Advisers in the Ministries and in the key positions. On the other hand, public regard for the Council of Ministers was undoubtedly weakened and opportunities for a strong man to achieve dictatorial power were increased.

The twenty-one Cabinets between 1921 and October, 1936, have been repeatedly formed from a group of some two score men. The inability, or reluctance as 'Iraqī critics of the Council maintain, to find a wider selection of men of Cabinet standard has been accentuated by the necessity of incorporating within the Council representatives of the Shī'a sect which, although forming a majority of 'Iraq's population, has been unable even to the present day, to provide experienced officials to the same extent as the Sunnī sect, due to the reluctance of the sect to acquire secular education. Furthermore, the harmony of the Cabinets has not been enhanced by the inclusion of members of the mutually antagonistic sects.

It has been no secret that public opinion, its confidence shaken in the Council and in Parliament, has leaned increasingly towards Turkey and Kemal Atatürk as suitable models for 'Iraq. Many leading 'Iraqīs have expressed admiration openly for Atatürk, several politicians, including Yāsīn Pasha, being credited with personal desires to emulate his role.

The seizure of power by General Baqir Sidqī and Hikmat

[1] Three Ministries resigned rather than abandon the 'Iraqī viewpoint when it came into collision with that of the British Government: the second of Ja'far Pasha, January 7th, 1928; the third of 'Abdul Muhsin Beg, January 20th, 1929; and that of Nājī Pasha, March 9th, 1930.

[2] *Supra*, p. 422, note.

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German representatives for the provision of military aid. A number of aircraft were in fact dispatched with an advance party to Baghdad and Mosul and armaments were supplied by the Vichy Government of Syria, who also put its aerodromes at the disposal of German aircraft; but the coup was premature from the point of view of the German Command, whose forces were required for the immediate conquest of Crete and the all-essential invasion of the Soviet Union, and the assistance given was too late and limited to prevent collapse.

Succeeding Governments co-operated effectively with the Allied war effort, and Iraq became a base for operations against the Levant and Persia (1941) and for aid to Russia, and in January 1943 she declared war on the Axis Powers and signed the Declaration of the United Nations. In 1945 a rebellion of the Kurdish Barzani tribe, which had continued intermittently since 1943, was finally suppressed, and the rebels took refuge in the so-called Kurdish Republic of Mahabad (north-west Persia) which had newly been formed under Soviet inspiration, and, after its collapse, in the Soviet Union itself.

Relations with Other Middle East Countries

In 1945 Iraq signed the Arab League Pact, towards whose realization Nuri as-Said, Prime Minister from 1941 to 1944, played a leading part, though the Arab states rejected as premature his further proposal for the union of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan in one state. A project in 1946 for a close union between Iraq and Jordan was criticized both in the Arab League and in Iraq and Jordan, and was diluted into a treaty of alliance and eternal brotherhood between the two countries, which provided for consultation in the event of aggression by a third party and military intervention by one party to suppress disorders or rebellion in the other. In 1947, in spite of internal opposition, a treaty of friendship with Turkey was ratified. It was intended that Turkey should sign similar treaties with other Arab states to form a Middle East bloc in replacement of the moribund Saadabad Pact, but in the event Jordan was the only other state to sign.

In 1946 permission was given for the formation of political parties, of which none had existed since the mid-thirties. Licences were granted to five, of which two were subsequently suppressed, but were refused to the Communist groups, which continued to operate, as they had done both before and after their reinforcement in 1941, in secret. Though considerably weakened by official action against them in 1947, they are alleged to have played an active part in the disturbances at

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Since the Palestine conflict the main features of Iraq's external relations have been: (1) the possibility of union between Iraq and Syria and, immediately after the assassination of King Abdullah, between Iraq and Jordan. The former possibility, apparently within measurable distance under the Hinawi regime in Syria, was blocked by the coup d'état of Adib Shishakli, and the latter by the stand of Tawfiq Abul-Huda and the disapproval of the Western and other Arab Powers. (2) An unpopular draft agreement with Egypt in 1950 binding both parties not to intervene in Syrian affairs for five years, and binding Iraq to consult Egypt in the case of an agreement with any third Power (this was considered derogatory to the honour and independence of Iraq and brought about the fall of the Cabinet); (3) Nuri Said's statesmanlike attempt in 1951 to mediate in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute in co-operation with the Foreign Minister of Pakistan; (4) consideration of the four-Power Middle East Defence scheme, towards which the attitude of successive Governments has varied, falling short equally of acceptance and rejection, while opposition elements have displayed varying degrees of hostility to it and considerable sympathy towards the formation of a neutral Arab bloc; and (5) the ratification in March 1952 of the Arab States' Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Pact. In some quarters the idea of a bloc has been extended to include Pakistan and sometimes India, being conceived as an Islamic or mid-Asiatic entity which should supplement and even supplant the Arab League.

Present Political Situation

Events in Palestine, Syria, Persia, and Egypt and the economic difficulties of a great part of the population have intensified the underlying ferment of the post-war period, which stern and continued action against Communism and incipient plans for national development have not so far availed to counteract. The rural majority, it is true, is still politically inert and merely lends its voting power to the landowners and tribal chiefs, but the spread of education is increasing the number of politically-conscious and under-privileged young townsmen who have provided, without much confidence in their efficiency or integrity, almost the sole support for the parties of extreme opposition. These parties have been constant in their denunciation of successive Governments as the tools of feudalism and imperialism, the more bitterly and irresponsibly for the realization that there is no foreseeable likelihood of their coming to power or even of influencing policy except at moments of crisis

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through the temporary support of the Baghdad mob. Even over the mob, once aroused, they have had no control, and demonstrations and rioting which they have played some part in provoking have been apt to benefit only the underground Communists. The real contestants for power since 1951 have been the parties based on the personalities of Nuri as-Said and Salih Jabr, both of them progressive in programme but supported by the same conservative commercial and landed interests, the party of Salih Jabr also by a certain Shii sentiment. In programme all five political parties[1] have been similar, though at any rate two of the three extreme parties have depended more on stated principle and less on personality than the others. Even in these the influence of personality has been greater than in British political parties, from which, too, they have differed in having as official members mostly professional politicians, with however a certain amount of public—mostly intellectual and student—support. The group of Nuri as-Said and its sympathizers have been in power during this period, the group of Salih Jabr maintaining an opposition which, mild at its inception, has, under the influence of personality and political developments, approximated increasingly to that of the more extreme parties, with which it has been in uneasy accord in opposing the new oil agreement of 1952 and demanding single-stage parliamentary elections for 1953.

Political tension and popular restlessness increased during the summer of 1952 under an irresolute caretaker Government which had been appointed in preparation for the elections, and in November a students' strike was converted by agitators into a demand for single-stage elections and resulted in rioting, arson, and loss of life. The army was called in to restore order and the non-political Chief of General Staff accepted the premiership with a mandate of pacification, which he was successful in implementing, though his well-meant attempts to improve the economic condition of the public were too superficial to be effective and disappointed the hopes which attended his popular appointment. Whether the return, in however restrained a form, of the army to politics will have re-established an old precedent is still to be seen. General Nur ad-Din's premiership was remote from military dictatorship, but it is inevitable that events in Syria and especially in Egypt should have turned some minds in that formerly unpopular direction.

[1] The five parties were: Constitutional Union Party of Nuri Said; Umma Socialist Party of Salih Jabr; Independence Party of Mohammed Mahdi Kubba; National Democratic Party of Kamil Chadirchi; United Popular Front of General Taha al-Hashimi.

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645 The General's Cabinet dissolved all the political parties in-
666 cluding the Constitutional Union, but conceded the opposition
665 demand for single-stage elections. Elections, carried out in January 1953, were boycotted by all but one of the former opposition parties, including that of Salih Jabr, on the charge of governmental control. The resulting chamber naturally showed an enormous majority for Nuri as-Said, though neither the boycott nor the existence of martial law can greatly have affected the issue: the extreme parties had anyway no prospect of success and it would appear that the party of Salih Jabr, in spite of its alleged expectations, was already outmanœuvred. The Cabinet which was subsequently formed under Jamil [185] Midfai remained in power till September; it apparently abandoned and indeed reversed its predecessor's cautious [722] attempt at economic reform. With martial law in force for little short of a year, political activity and polemic was for the time being stilled; but the suppression of a riot and the election of a conservative Parliament have not altered the fundamentals of the situation. A new Cabinet was formed on 16 September by Dr Mohammed Fadhil Jamali, former President of the Chamber of Deputies; martial law was ended by royal decree on 8 October and political parties were permitted to resume their activities.

668 But urban unrest, inflamed by the increasing participation of students in politics, can be expected to continue and spread, eventually to the rural population as well, so long as the public believes that the economics and administration of the country are subjected to the interest of a ruling class and its supposed allies among Western imperialist Powers who, in its opinion, maintain the State of Israel and are likely to involve Iraq on their own side in a third world war. Much of the bitterness with which this belief is held springs from privation or the fear of it. Once substantial results appear from the new programme of development, and the public is made aware of them, a foundation will have been laid for political stability.

Government and Constitution

643 The King of Iraq is King Faisal II, son of King Ghazi and
642 grandson of King Faisal ibn Hussain. The legislative power is
646 vested with the King in Parliament. Parliament consists of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Senators are appointed by the King from among those who 'by their acts have gained the confidence and trust of the people, and those who have an honourable past in the service of the Government and the country'. In number they may not exceed one-fourth of the